The Social, Political and Economic Effects of Afghan War on Pakistan
Dr. Shabnum Akhtar
ABSTRACT:
Afghanistan is a conflict-ridden state for more than last three decades and, Pakistan as a front-line state is affected very severely. Pakistan is a very active and important neighbor of Afghanistan. Instability in Afghanistan has grave implications for internal and external security of Pakistan. It has adversely affected Pakistan’s socio-economic and political sectors. Moreover, the consequences of the Afghan war-damaged Pakistan’s international image. Pakistan has been fighting terrorism and violence since the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. In the post-US intervention in Afghanistan in 2001, Pakistan has become more unstable than Afghanistan. The so-called war on terror has, in fact, become a war of terror in which Pakistan is as much a victim as is Afghanistan. Afghan war allowed ethnic and sectarian warfare and Islamic fundamentalism to tighten their grip on the country. In this study, an effort is made to provide a detailed account of the consequences of Pakistan’s engagement in Afghanistan since the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The article will point out the extent to which Pakistan’s interests is met in the process of its engagement in Afghanistan. The work will also come out with suggestive measures that Pakistan should take in its policymaking both at the domestic and international level, to preserve its sovereignty, security and integrity.
KEYWORDS: Pakistan, Afghanistan, USA, Security, Terrorism, USSR.
INTRODUCTION:
While committing on the geostrategic importance of Pakistan, Stephen Cohen, an American scholar said, "While history has been unkind to Pakistan, its geography has been its greatest benefit. It has a resource-rich area in the north-west, people rich in the north-east."1
On the basis of physical location, Pakistan is a South Asian country, in some ways it is also an extension of the Middle East and Central Asia. It is a land bridge linking Central Asia, South Asia, and West Asia. While the world is facing energy crisis and terrorism, Pakistan is a route for transportation and a frontline state against terrorism.
Pakistan has great advantages of its geo-strategic location; however, it has suffered a lot from the same reasons. Even after 69 years of its independence, Pakistan has failed to establish internal stability. The territorial issues and border conflicts with India, the socio-economic differences within the country, the struggle for a share of power between the provinces, and the early death of the founder of Pakistan, Quaid-i-Azam, Mohammad Ali Jinnah are some of the realities that Pakistan has faced since the day of its inception. Moreover, the roots of current ongoing political disorder in Pakistan dates back to 1970s when Pakistan was pulled in Afghanistan when the later became the battleground for the cold war rivalry between the two superpowers, the USA and the USSR. Afghanistan is a land-locked country and Pakistan is the most significant front-line state of Afghanistan. Because of its location, Pakistan is influencing and is getting influenced by the developments inside Afghanistan.2
Pakistan is the only country in the world which came into existence on the basis of Islam. Immediately after partition, there was a lot of confidence in Pakistan that the Muslim countries of the world would draw closer to Pakistan and indeed might move towards a Pan-Islamic grouping of Muslim nations.3 But due to border dispute with Afghanistan and India and ideological differences with other Muslim countries like Iran Pakistan’s dream remained unfulfilled. Pakistan was always keen to have friendly relations with Kabul, but Afghanistan backed by Pakistan’s rival countries always aggravated Pakistan. Afghanistan made very early clear to Pakistan that it will not accept the dominant position of Pakistan in the region. In fact, Afghanistan was the only country that voted against Pakistan’s admission to the United Nations in 1947 because of its claims over the Durand Line-Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan on its western side.4
Durand Line Issue between Pakistan and Afghanistan:
The Durand line is perhaps the only main issue that continued to affect the relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan since the inception of Pakistan. Pakistan views Durand Line as the legitimate international border with Afghanistan, while Afghanistan demanded the creation of a Pashtun state, Pastunistan, that would link the Pushtun tribes living in Afghanistan with those in the NWFP and Baluchistan.5 For Pakistan, Afghanistan claims were clearly unacceptable, amounted to demanding the greater part of the Pakistan’s territory and the 30 million to 35 million Pushtuns in Pakistan represent 15 to 20 percent of the country’s population.6
Pakistan was still a very weak state and vulnerable to outside pressure, and many did not expect it even to survive as an independent country. Security and survival as an independent nation remained dominant issues in the minds of policymakers in Pakistan. Afghanistan became part of the combination of perceived security threat that required Pakistan’s military buildup. Pakistan has consistently sought refuge in external alignments and alliances to preserve and promote its security. However, never did Afghanistan’s claim received any international backing, and its small military could not constitute a serious threat to Pakistan.
The boundary dispute continued to remain a constant irritant factor in the relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan, even though it touched some time high or low. Pakistan tied Afghanistan’s aspirations for the Pashtunistan to an Indian plan to break up Pakistan. Pakistan has never enjoyed good relations with either Afghanistan or India, the two neighboring countries with which it shares the largest borders. Pakistan perceives that India wants to subvert the state of Pakistan either by breaking it up or by reabsorbing its territory into what the Pakistanis called the Hindu Plan of ‘Akhand Barat’.7 The actual problem confronting Pakistan was that it had become a target of the Indo-Soviet strategic alliance. Both Soviet Union and India paid a lip service to Pushtunistan for decades. When Soviets intervened in Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan was able to divert the attention of Afghanistan from Pushtun issue to the bigger threat of Soviet intervention.
Pakistan’s Relation with Afghanistan after the USSR intervention in Afghanistan:
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 was a major turning point in international politics. Pakistan was pulled into the geopolitics of cold war as USSR intervention was perceived as a mortal threat to Pakistan which stands just next door to Afghanistan. If Soviets succeeded in stabilizing the political situation in Afghanistan, what would be the Soviets next move, was a matter of concern for Pakistan. Afghanistan was to be the gateway to Pakistan and to the warm waters and Central Zone of the oil-rich Gulf States which were perceived to be the real Soviet agenda. General Zia ul Haq, the ruler of Pakistan rightly put it “to fight the battle for Pakistan inside Afghanistan.”8 Besides posing a direct strategic threat to the security of Pakistan, the Soviet military move into Afghanistan also deeply affronted Pakistani president Zia-ul-Haq’s sense of Islamic brotherhood. Zia personally was dedicated anti- Communist. He felt it a moral obligation to give aid to those condemning against the aggressive “Godless Creed”.9
For more than a year after the communist takeover in Kabul, Pakistan was nearly alone in its support for the Mujahideen (holy warriors). President Carter of the USA in his speech regarding Afghanistan said: ‘we will provide military equipment, food, and other assistance to help Pakistan defend its independence and national security against the seriously increased threat from the North.’10 But the reality is that Soviet expansion was a threat to the United States more than it was to Pakistan or any other country. Soviets next march might or might not be Pakistan, but it was certainly providing an ideological threat to the capitalist United States. Unlike the USA, Pakistan felt no strong rivalry with the Soviet Union, economically, militarily or ideologically. As a matter of fact, Soviet expansion was a threat both to the capitalist west and to Islam.
Pakistan’s involvement in Afghanistan war was based on its own clear short-term and long-term national objectives. The long-term interests were:
Ø the annoying problem of Durand line between Pakistan and Afghanistan could be resolved;
Ø If the U.S. led campaign succeeded, Pakistan could legitimately demand setting up of a Pakistan friendly government in Kabul, and lastly,
Ø By remaining an ally of the west, it could pursue its covert nuclear program.11
Pakistan’s short-term objective was to secure Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and to end the communist rule in Afghanistan.
Pakistan was extended all-out support by the west, in particular, the United States and several Muslim countries as Pakistan’s geographical location is such that it serves as the best base for operations in Afghanistan. Pakistan emerged as a 'front-line' state, the major player in the game and the principal channel through which assistance was provided to the Afghan mujahedeen. “Jihadis” policy was given a major boost when Washington directly involved and provided direct support to the mujahedeen, or as the Ronald Reagan preferred to call them, “the moral equivalent to our founding fathers”12
Pakistan succeeded in building and holding together an international consensus against the Soviet invasion through the 1980s. The biggest impact of Pakistan’s Afghan policy was that it provided a direction, a base, and organization to Afghan resistance. Pakistan’s policy kept the USSR engaged in Afghanistan and contained and controlled its expansionist plans, if any. Pakistan took some risks by confronting the Soviet Union. The Soviet invasion was the challenge as well as the opportunity for Pakistan. It was the challenge as Pakistan has to engage an ideologically hostile superpower. Moscow repeatedly warned Pakistan that it was playing with the fire and threatened with dire consequences. It provides an opportunity to neutralize the bitter experience with Afghanistan. That was the best period in the entire history of relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan.13
Pakistan’s open border enabled more than 3.2 million Afghans to take refuge and relief aid in camps and unrestricted in their movement to participate in the economy of Pakistan’s cities. Pakistan housed most of the Afghan refugees in NWFP and Baluchistan. The refugee camps became the recruitment centers for the Mujahideen groups. Pakistan became the main conduit for the flow of arms to the Afghan resistance and a frontline state against the perceived Soviet expansionism. It earned international acclaim and the gratitude of millions of Afghan refugees who sought refuge in the country, and for Pakistan’s assistance in liberating the country. Without the Pakistan’s support, there could have been no Afghan resistance movement.14
Consequences of Soviet war on Pakistan:
The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the end of the cold war considerably altered the geo-strategic scenario in the region. In the new transformed world order, Pakistan’s Afghan policy seemed a bit confused. The Soviet withdrawal was completed by 15th February 1989, leaving in place the weak Mohammad Najibullah government.15 Despite its best efforts, Pakistan did not have a government of its choice in Afghanistan. The Soviets were out of Afghanistan, while the U.S. was celebrating its victory by turning its back towards Afghanistan. But Pakistan remained stuck in Afghanistan.
In 1985, Benazir Bhutto, the leader of Pakistan’s People’s party, publicly questioned the wisdom of Pakistan’s Afghan Policy. She said that the United States had used Pakistan as an instrument to fight its battle against the Soviets, allowing the risks to fall on Pakistan as Moscow provided clandestine support for Separatist tendencies in Sind and Baluchistan provinces of Pakistan, while Washington limited its responsibilities to merely to supplying arms.16
Pakistan’s interest in Afghanistan did not end with the departure of the Soviet forces as the Soviet-backed Najibullah government was still in power. Pakistan was not ready to enter into any deal for setting the political future of that country until Taliban took the control of Afghanistan in 1996. For the first time, Pakistan realized that its long-awaited interest in Afghanistan is fulfilled. Pakistan was the first countries to recognize the Taliban rule in Afghanistan. Taliban served Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan better than ever. Pakistan’s rival country, India, was denied access and has to close its embassy in Afghanistan. Peace was apparently achieved in Afghanistan, thus paving the way for Pakistan to reach out to Central Asia and resume the repatriation of Afghan refugees. Unfortunately, Taliban could not rule for a longer time due to international criticism against their strict rule of Shariah law in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s association with the Taliban caused major image and policy problems. Domestically, Pakistan has to face Islamic extremism and increasing influence of religious parties in politics. In the area of foreign policy, Pakistan’s rivalry with Iran and the Central Asian States grew in intensity. The Central Asian States were fearful of a fundamentalist onslaught within their frontier. Pakistan felt difficulty in building confidence with the CARs.17
The conclusion of 14 years of war in Afghanistan had a strong bearing on Pakistan than any other country. At the end of the day, Pakistan got little by its policy towards Afghanistan. Pakistan had never imagined that this period will become a breeding ground for Pakistan future problems-the problems that would become permanent in Pakistani culture. Pakistan has become one of the most unstable and insecure places in the world. The legacy of Afghan Jihad continued to haunt the region.
The involvement of Pakistan as a central stage in the Afghan war, with largely dependent on foreign aid, encouraged other countries to interfere in the internal affairs of Pakistan. A vast number of weapons found their way into the open market. Random bombing and killing, Sectarian violence and religious extremism are on increase in Pakistan.18 The religious extremism and militancy had become mixed up with the unholy alliances of criminals and smugglers, in the FATA region of Pakistan. Prior to the Afghan Jihad, there was no local production of heroin in either Afghanistan or Pakistan. By the end of the Afghan jihad, the picture has changed drastically. Pakistan- Afghanistan border became the world’s leading producer of both Opium and processed heroin. In a report released in early 2001, the United Nations International Drug Control Program traced the rapid expansion of Afghan opium production. Accounting for less than 5% of global opium registered heroin addicts in Pakistan rose from 130 in 1977 to 30,000 in 1988. But the United Nations Drug Control Program estimated that the actual heroin addicts by 1997 had risen to 1.7 million.19
The heroin and Kalashnikov culture has undermined Pakistan’s political economy and society ever since. As in Afghanistan, the Pakistani jihadi culture tended to go hand to hand with the drug culture and the effect of heroin and opium trade was devastating. Even if Afghan jihad was over, but its effects on both the societies are still there.20
The 11 September 2001 attacks on the US changed the geopolitics of the region. The US launched the Global War on Terrorism against the Taliban and Al-Qaida in Afghanistan. Pakistan alone couldn’t extend its support to the Taliban for longer time seeing that, almost all the countries of the world had already taken a stand with the US in its war on terrorism in Afghanistan. The US intervened in Afghanistan and Pakistan became an important ally of the US in Afghanistan.
Pakistan’s Involvement in Afghanistan in the post 9/11, 2001 Event:
US had played “in and out policy towards Pakistan; while Afghanistan has been the factor responsible for the US to pull Pakistan in its orbit and, to push it out as well. Pakistan was again declared as the frontline state in the US-led Global War against Terrorism. Pakistan’s geographical location and the international pressure left Pakistan with no option than to join the US-led war in Afghanistan.
Pro-Pakistan Taliban rule in Afghanistan was toppled down after the US intervention in Afghanistan. Pakistan could not stop the new arrangements in Kabul and supported the Bonn Agreement in 2001. Pakistan’s pro-active so-called counterterrorism strategies have indeed improved Pakistan’s image from being a failed state to an important player in the international politics. Once again, the doors of the US military and economic aid were opened to Pakistan. However, Pakistan’s decision to join with the U.S. was not supported by large sections of Pakistani public and there were stormy protests, hundreds of extremists joined these protests and threatened jihad against the Pakistani government. The hard-line Islamic parties that maintained close links with the Taliban movement in Afghanistan were not prepared to spare the Musharaf regime and what they considered its disloyalties to the Islamic cause. As jamait-e-Islami (JI) leader Liaquat Baluch puts it, ‘the year 2001, saw the implementation of anti-Muslim Zionist agenda in the name of a New World Order, but ironically with the help of Muslim leaders.’21 There developed a big gap between official body and public opinion. There were grave law and order problem affecting civil life and damaging the economic infrastructure. The image of Pakistan in the world suffered badly as it is seen by many as the lawless country.22
After the resurgence of Taliban in Afghanistan in 2004, Afghan conflict spread in Pakistan’s tribal areas (FATA) and parts of its two provinces NWFP (North-West Frontier Province) and Baluchistan. Pakistan was pressurized to ‘do more’ in the international media criticizing Pakistan for tolerating Taliban safe haven in the FATA. In December 2004, President Musharaf called his “biggest fear” the extremism, terrorism, and militancy that have really polluted society in Pakistan. Pakistani leadership was criticized by the extreme Islamists for siding with the Americans and, the liberals, blaming Musharaf’s take over as undermining country’s democracy. On the Afghan side, Pakistan was blamed for reemerging Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan.23
Cost of Pakistan in the US War in Af-Pak Region
9/11 and the consequent war on terror have far-reaching impacts on Pakistan. The US and its allies prepared for military operation in tribal areas of Pakistan but the preferred option for them was to push Musharraf regime to pursue an aggressive policy against the militants, operating from the tribal areas. The massive advance of the Pakistani military against Al-Qaeda hide-outs and “Taliban” in southern Waziristan took a tremendous toll on the local population. The semi-covert campaign of drone strikes by the US to kill Al Qaeda and Taliban forces based in Northern Pakistan killed more tribal civilians in the region than ever before. These flying death angels (drones) have killed about 3,000 people, including many civilians, as of March 2014. The arguments about how many of the dead are civilians are nearly as intense as the disputes about the legality of the strikes. Many legal scholars regard them as clear violations of international law. Pilotless drone strikes in the North West Pakistan inflamed public anger and bolster support for the fighters. At least 52,000 Pakistanis (combatant and noncombatant) have been killed since 2004 and more than 50,000 have been injured during that period by the various parties to the conflict. This does not include the likely deaths of tens of thousands more combatants — both insurgents and Pakistani government forces. The number of Pakistanis are both internally displaced and have sought refuge in other countries. Millions of Pakistanis have been pushed from their homes in the last several years, although the exact numbers are difficult to determine. Most of the fighting is concentrated in the Northwestern Pakistan, near the border with Afghanistan. In 2012, a half million Pakistanis are reported internally displaced in the northwest region of Pakistan, because of fighting.24
One of the more surprising findings of The Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict (CIVIC) was that civilian casualties in Pakistan are even greater than those in Afghanistan. There have been over 2,100 civilian deaths in 2009 from terrorism alone in Pakistan and a comparable number thus far in 2010. In Afghanistan, there are about the same number of civilians killed but from all forms of conflict-related violence including NATO airstrikes, artillery crossfire between militants and ISAF armed forces. Coinciding with the release of the CIVIC report, dozens of people, mostly from North Waziristan, staged a sit-in to protest drone attacks they say are being carried out by CIA, killing "innocent civilians"25.
Table -1: Estimated Total Direct Death and Injury in Pakistan, 2001- June 2016
|
|
Killed |
Wounded |
|
Pakistani Civilians |
22,100 |
40,792 |
|
Pakistani Security Forces |
8,214 |
14,583 |
|
Taliban and Other Militants |
31,000 |
11,415 |
|
Contractors Reported by US DOL |
42 |
134 |
|
Unreported Contractor Estimate |
48 |
Unknown |
|
NGO Humanitarian Workers |
92 |
87 |
|
Journalists |
53 |
Unknown |
|
Total |
61,549 |
67,011 |
Costs Of War, Watson Institute, International & Public Affairs, Brown University
Terrorism destroyed Pakistan physical and human capital since 2001. Due to war and insecurity trade activities becomes limited and economic growth slowing down. It also restricted the Foreign Direct Investment.
Where is Pakistan Today?
The present war in Pakistan is a consequence of the U.S. war in Afghanistan. The multiple interrelated armed conflicts in Pakistan have caused significant displacement, injury, and death. The Pakistani government is threatened by insurgents who are pressing on with a campaign of suicide bombings that have killed civilians, police, and soldiers, despite a series of army offensives against them. On June 15, 2014, Pakistan army launched, Operation Zarb-e-Azab to mob up the major areas from insurgent groups.26 The initial hope that this could contain the war has turned into its opposite. The war intensified, terrorist reprisals increased, and the war spread to other areas of Pakistan. The army spokesman, Maj. Gen. Asif Ghafoor, said acts of terrorism were being carried out "from hostile powers and from sanctuaries in Afghanistan". Pakistan closed the main Torkham border crossing with Afghanistan after the attack of 17 February 2017. The attack was deadliest in Pakistan since 16 December 2014, when militants assaulted an army-run school in Peshawar, killing 154 people, mostly school children.27
Table-2: Estimated Losses in Pakistan (2001-2015)
|
Year |
$ Billion |
Rs Billion |
% Changes |
|
2001-02 |
2.67 |
163.9 |
- |
|
2002-03 |
2.75 |
160.8 |
3 |
|
2003-04 |
2.93 |
168.8 |
6.7 |
|
2004-05 |
3.41 |
202.4 |
16.3 |
|
2005-06 |
3.99 |
202.4 |
16.9 |
|
2006-07 |
4.67 |
283.2 |
17.2 |
|
2007-08 |
6.94 |
434.1 |
48.6 |
|
2008-09 |
9.18 |
720.6 |
32.3 |
|
2009-2010 |
13.56 |
1136.4 |
47.7 |
|
2010-11 |
23.77 |
2037.3 |
75.3 |
|
2011-12 |
11.98 |
10 52.8 |
-49.6 |
|
2012-13 |
9.97 |
964.24 |
-16.8 |
|
2013-14 |
6.63 |
681.68 |
-33.5 |
|
2014-15 |
4.53 |
457.93 |
-31.7 |
|
Total |
107 |
8702.8 |
|
Source: Report presented by the (MOF), Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Joint Ministerial Grou
Afghan war has adversely destroyed the social fabric of Pakistan. A byproduct of the Soviet invasion and the civil war to follow was the outpouring of at least 3 million Afghan refugees into Pakistan between 1979-89. After the US-led toppling of the Taliban in 2001, the figure reached to five million, out of which 85% refugees were ethnic Pushtuns. By March 2009, 1.7 million registered Afghans have been repatriated. Pakistan consistently upholds itself as one of the largest refugee-hosting countries in the world. The radical extremist and militant forces have been identified as a primary threat to Pakistan’s survival and stability. No one can guess where Pakistan will be one year down the line.
Above and beyond an unstable Afghanistan, the current problems trace their origins to insecure methodologies and a total lack of control over its gear, engagement in the application of policies. The religious militancy in Pakistan is more because of the depressed socio-economic conditions, poverty, and unemployment; by the lack of attention by the successive governments in Pakistan. Had Pakistan remained on the path of economic growth, as appeared to be in the 1960s, economic development would have generated modernizing impulses and prevented the backward drift towards anti-progress extremism. During Ayub’s time in the 1960s, Pakistan’s economy grew at an average of 6% annually, and Pakistan was often cited as a model for economic growth among developing countries. The country could be counted as the most technologically advanced within the Islamic world.28 Today it has fallen, behind other Muslim countries like Turkey, Iran, Malaysia, and Egypt. Turkey emerged as the Islamic world’s strongest manufacturing economy and educational base an honor that once belonged to Pakistan. Had Pakistan not become the frontline state in the final episode of the cold war, it had a good chance of economic and socio-cultural transformation.
A Way Forward:
Time is ripe when Pakistan should reframe its internal and external policy. History has provided enough lessons to Pakistan. Pakistan’s contemporary difficulties and its turbulent history require reference to the weakness of its institutions of governance. There is lack of clarity in national priorities and vision, intellectual confusion and absence of broad consensus on Pakistan’s role as a state in the life of the people and in the world.
The major threat to Pakistan’s stability is coming from Afghanistan. Pakistan has to improve its relations with Afghanistan. The relations between both the countries are spoiled by mutual mistrust and misperceptions. Both the countries have to realize that their destinies are so intertwined; their impact on each other and on the region must make them more careful in dealing with each other. The policy of mutual cooperation and friendship between Pakistan and Afghanistan is a win-win policy for both the countries.
Pakistan is a major player in the region with substantial demographic and military strength. The establishment of a durable peace in Afghanistan and a friendly regime in Kabul which is at peace at home and its neighbors should remain Pakistan’s objective. It has an indispensable role in helping reconciliation in Afghanistan. But, no durable structural adjustment in Afghanistan would be possible without Pakistan itself undergoing structural readjustment in the first place. Pakistan has been at war with terrorist groups for more than a decade. In recent years it has launched major offensives against militant strongholds in the tribal regions along the border with Afghanistan, but insurgents have continued to carry out attacks elsewhere in the country. However, recently it is observed that the results of the comprehensive, all-out law enforcement action Zarb e Azb launched against all terrorist groups without any discrimination has been remarkably successful. ‘Zarb e Azb’ has started paying a dividend in terms of the overall improved security situation in the country. Moreover, Pakistan has transitioned to new political innings under the leadership of Imran Khan by this year.
Imran Khan’s emergence has been observed with excitement and expectations in the revival of the foreign policy of Pakistan in the domestic sphere. He showed a willingness to resolve conflicts peacefully with neighboring countries. Imran Khan has emphasized that peace in Afghanistan meant peace in Pakistan. Afghan government showed a positive response and, both Pakistan and Afghanistan institutionalized their working relationship through Afghanistan Pakistan Action Plan for Peace and Solidarity (APAPPS). This approach is expected to help both the countries to have a durable and affordable relationship between them.
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13. Ibid, p.278.
14. Haqqani Husain, Pakistan Between Mosque and Military, (Pakistan: Vanguard Books, 2005), p.189.
15. Khan Mohammad Riaz, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Conflict. Extremism, and Resistance to Modernity, op cit, pp.16-17.
16. Weinbaum Marvin G, Pakistan and Afghanistan; Resistance and Reconstruction, op cit, p.26.
17. Jalalzai Musa Khan, Foreign Policy of Afghanistan, op cit., p.302.
18. Khan Riaz Mohammad, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Conflict. Extremism, and Resistance to Modernity, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2011), p.216.
19. Mamdani Mahmood, Good Muslim and Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror, (Delhi: Permanent Black, Harmony, 2005),p.143.
20. Shibil Siddiqi, “Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations: History and Geopolitics in a Regional and International context, implications for Canadian Foreign Policy, available at, www.gordonfn.org/resfiles/siddidiqi_Pak%20final2.pdf, p.25.
21. Mamdani Mahmood, Good Muslim and Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror, op cit, p.146.
22. Jalalzai Musa Khan, The crisis of Governance in Pakistan, Kashmir, Afghanistan, Sectarian Violence and Economic Crisis, (Lahore: Sang-Meel Publications, 2003), pp.143-44.
23. Khan Riaz Mohammad, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Conflict. Extremism, and Resistance to Modernity, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2011), p.231.
24. Crawford Neta C, “War Related Death and Injury in Pakistan, 2004-2011”, (September 2011), available at http://watson.brown.edu, (accessed on April, 2017), visit also http://www.dawn.com/news/590011/pakistani-civilian-deaths-exceed-afghan-in-terror-war-report
25. http://www.dawn.com/news/590011/pakistani-civilian-deaths-exceed-afghan-in-terror-war-report
26. Hussain Sajjad, “Pak: After Air Strikes, Army Moves into Miranshah in FATA”, Kashmir Reader, (27 June 2014).
27. Anis Muhammad, “Each drop of Nation’s Blood to be Avenged: COA,” The News, (February 17, 2017) Available at https://www.thenews.com.pk, (accessed on April, 2017).
28. Khan Riaz Mohammad, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Conflict, Extremism, and Resistance to Modernity, op cit, pp. 316-317.
Received on 15.10.2018 Modified on 31.10.2018
Accepted on 29.11.2018 ©AandV Publications All right reserved
Res. J. Humanities and Social Sciences. 2019; 10(1):45-50.
DOI: 10.5958/2321-5828.2019.00009.3