INTRODUCTION:

During the course of the Second World War, Indian politics witnessed the unfolding of developments that were destined to influence the entire future course of Indian history. Keeping this in view, the activities of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and the Hindu Mahasabha during this period appear all the more important and worthy of attention. This paper attempts to analyse the activities of these organizations on the basis of government records and to understand how the colonial state perceived those activities. We have a number of government sources clearly establishing that, just as in the case of all other organizations, the colonial state kept a close watch on the RSS and the Hindu Mahasabha. These records provide important insights into the colonial perceptions regarding howthetwo organizations reacted to the Quit India Movement, the Second World War, and the Pakistan demand, and, above all, how they were seen to be going about their work of political mobilization.

RashtriyaSwayamsevak Sangh

In 1940, the British Government had imposed a ban on the members of voluntary organizations wearing uniforms and practising military drills. The ban became a matter of chronic dispute between the authorities and the RSS, as even though the Sangh leadership agreed to abide by the ban, there were differences in the interpretation of the concerned clause, which allowed the local Sangh branches a lot of maneuverability. Frequent violations of the ban were reported from all over the country. That the government did not take the defiance lightly is evident by the way the Home and Political departments in 1942 were discussing ways and means to contain the RSS.¹ Express orders were sent to the district authorities to collect all possible information on the RSS.² In Central Provinces, district authorities were asked to submit reports on RSS activities.

Even a most casual look at the government reports of the period shows how rapidly the RSS organization was growing. In 1942, the Sangh already had a membership of 7,000 in Nagpur, 4,000 in Wardha and its collections on the gurudakshinaday were to the tune of Rs. 8,000 to 10,000, a considerable sum by the standard of those days.³

Measured speculation on the strength of the Sangh and the ‘danger’ that it might pose to the government characterized the district reports from the Central Provinces. For example, the Jubblepur report notes that the RSS activities were indeed on the increase, but, it adds, there might not be any subversive programme by it in the near future.⁴ Reports from other districts, however, held that the Sangh was definitely becoming too powerful to be ignored any longer and that it would be able to give fair resistance in the areas where it was organized well.⁵ It was alleged that the real object of the Sangh was to organize the Hindu youths to defend the community against the Muslim attacks and to win independence for India.⁶ Significantly, although the Sangh as an organization apparently remained aloof from the Quit India disturbances, there were reports of individual members participating in subversive activities.⁷

The RSS and the Hindu Mahasabha were in close contact with each other. In official circles, the RSS was even described as the Hindu Mahasabha’s answer to the Khaksars.⁸ It would appear that the Sangh was guided at this time by a spirit of militancy in tune with the volatile situation in the country. At a summer camp in Poona, M.S. Golwalkar, the RSS chief, declared categorically that ‘it was not possible to get swaraj by begging it from foreigners’ and that it could only be ‘obtained by strength’.⁹

The organization of the Sangh seems to have drawn the government’s attention. The absence of elective and committee systems seems to have led the government to doubt its democratic credentials as an organization.¹⁰ The government on its part traced the origins of the Sangh organization to Fascism, and even asserted that Chalak – leader in RSS – was the exact equivalent of Fuehrer.¹¹ Be that as it may, the Sangh arguably had at this stage a rather narrow social and regional base in terms of membership, in that the Maharashtrians, and especially the Maharashtrian Chitpavan Brahmans, formed the bulk of the Sangh membership.¹²

The launch of the Quit India Movement by the INC in August 1942 caused a great political upheaval all over India. It highlighted the vulnerability of the British regime in India and emboldened the political activists working for the freedom of the country. A government report for 1942 thus describes the Sangh’s activities:

The leaders are continually sending the warning to the people that the government is getting weaker day by day and pointing to the Sangh as the only organization which would be able to protect the Hindu community and Hindu religion from external aggression and defy goondaism in times of anarchy.¹³

That the Sangh had an increasingly powerful appeal to the people can be seen from its organizational growth. In 1936, it had 200 branches with a membership of 25,000, which shot up to 700 branches and 1,50,000 members by the end of 1941.¹⁴

The RSS activities were often wrapped in secrecy; strict discipline over the cadres was maintained.¹⁵ The literature prescribed for the members included the biographies of personalities as diverse as Shivaji, Hedgewar, Tilak, Savarkar, Shraddhanand, Hitler, Mussolini, Lenin, and Mazzini.¹⁶ It would appear from this that the Sangh did not make models of the extreme right alone, but did the same with all kinds of illustrious personalities, including the revolutionaries and communists.

To come back to the organizational aspect of the RSS, the year 1943 witnessed an intensification of its activities, especially in the Deccan and Chhattisgarh – regions with a number of native Hindu states.¹⁷ Already, membership in Central Provinces (CP) had reached 33,344 while in Bombay it was 20,476.¹⁸ There were even reports of the Sangh getting members from amongst the ordinance factory workers – reports that alarmed the government.¹⁹ In other parts of the country too, the RSS activity was picking up. Within one year in Punjab, the membership rose from 10,000 to 14,000.²⁰ There were reports of enthusiastic participation of the Benaras Hindu University students.²¹ In a meeting at Wardha, on 26 March 1943, M.S. Golwalkar exhorted the volunteers to take the Sangh to the countryside. Even women were being trained in military activities. This was, however, discontinued after sometime.²² In May 1943, three Officers Training Camps were organized in Central Provinces, involving 2,000 volunteers from different parts of the country.²³

Throughout the year, Golwalkar and other ideologues of the Sangh kept exhorting the volunteers for sacrifice and martyrdom.²⁴ The volunteers were told that the time was fast approaching when their training would be put to use and that the Sangh was preparing for the final struggle for the independence and unity of India. A speaker at Jubblepur asserted that ‘the aim of the Sangh was to drive out the British’.²⁵

That the government saw the RSS as a political enemy is obvious from the fact that the spurt in the organization’s activities in the second half of 1943 seriously alarmed the Central Government. Letters were sent to the provinces advising them to contain the RSS through all possible means.²⁶ During this period, the Sangh gained a lot of ground in United Provinces (UP), where military training again gave rise to considerable alarm on part of the provincial administration.²⁷ Punjab was another area of remarkable growth in the Sangh organization. Out of 29 districts of the province, 25 had at least one branch, and the total number of branches rose to 108.²⁸ The provincial government was so alarmed by the RSS activities that it requested the Central Government to put a ban on holding camps. In addition, orders were issued to the district authorities to put down, with an iron hand, the military activities of the RSS. In December 1943, the government debarred its servants from joining the RSS.²⁹ Thus the British tried to suppress the RSS as an organization and put all possible obstacles to its growth.

During the period under review, the RSS had not yet come into its own in Bengal, but there were unmistakable signs of growth. By 1943, there were regular RSS branches in Calcutta, Malda, Mymensingh, Rajshahi, Pabna, Navadip, Howrah, and Behrampur.³⁰ We do not, however, know how the government reacted to the opening of these branches.

Coming to the activities of the RSS in what is now Rajasthan, one can say that the government was clearly concerned about the growth in the organization’s influence in the area. Thus, on 27 January, 1944, Chief Commissioner, Ajmer-Merwara forwarded in a secret letter to the Home Department in Delhi an extract from a memorandum of Superintendent of District Police, Ajmer-Merwara to the Deputy Commissioner on the activities of the RSS in the region, with a clear endorsement of the views expressed therein.³¹ From this communication, it comes out that the RSS had by this time eight branches in the region, six in Ajmer, one in Nasirabad and one in Beawar with the total number of volunteers estimated at about 500.³²

The report traces the trajectory of growth of the RSS from around the beginning of 1942. It mentions that ‘from January 1942 members of the Sangh were regularly instructed in physical exercises and lathi practice’ and that ‘by March 1942 the membership had reached about 90’.³³ It is then mentioned that in June 1942 seven local volunteers of the RSS attended a camp at its headquarters in Nagpur where they received ‘training on military lines’. According to the report, there was significant growth of the RSS by December 1942. It is reported that ‘at the end of December 1942 a camp was held at Ajmer attended by about 400 volunteers from Jodhpur, Udaipur, Jaipur, Kishangarh, and Beawar in addition to the local volunteers’.³⁴

In the Ajmer-Marwara area, the RSS was organized by UmakantApte of Nagpur, which again points out to the Maharashtrian flavour of the RSS Ajmer alone had no less than eight branches and local members were regularly sent to the Nagpur camps. It is interesting to note that the government reports of the period attribute the increased popularity of the Sangh to its rivalry with the local Arya Samaj. It was asserted that ‘from June 1943 the influence of the Sangh increased as it was opposed by other Arya Samaj organizations which had become jealous of its growing influence’.³⁵

Reports also mention that ‘on October 3, 1943 the Sangh organized celebrations in connection with the Dasahara festival which were attended by about 250 volunteers and 200 others’.³⁶ It is further reported that the ‘annual camp from December 24 to 26 again was attended by about 500 volunteers from Ajmer, Beawar and Kishangarh’ and that in this case ‘activities were confined to physical exercises and country games and nothing objectionable took place’.³⁷

The Sangh volunteers here did not always abide by the ban on military training and the use of uniforms. In one of the camps, words of command and drill were used by the volunteers, which prompted the government into arresting eighteen youths.³⁸ All the detenues were, however, released after they agreed to submit apologies.³⁹ Yet, the ban was not taken any more seriously; attempts at lathi drill were continued off and on, arousing serious concern in the government circles. The report also regrets the fact that V.N. Limaye and the President, Dayashankar Vakil ‘could not be prosecuted as they had not taken part in drill and had carefully abstained from giving any word of command’.⁴⁰

It was believed by the local authorities that the best way to deal with the RSS was to ban the camps altogether.⁴¹ Thus, the report says:

The RashtriyaSwayamsevak Sangh appears to be treading in the footsteps of the Khaksars. The Notifications prohibiting the performance of military drill and the wearing of military uniform are not entirely effective in preventing the enrollment of the volunteers and their training to acting together through the medium of physical exercises and instructions in the use of the lathis. The holding of camps facilitates this. I consider that the sooner the holding of the camps of the type organized by the Sangh can be banned the better.⁴²

The Central Government was, however, convinced that the time for such a blanket ban on all camps had not yet arrived.⁴³

It could be argued that the RSS was able to develop only a moderate presence in parts of Rajasthan, especially in the Ajmer-Merwara area, during the period 1942-44. This was perhaps partly due to the fact that the region was dominated by princely states which were closely monitored by the government with the help of residents, political agents, as well as a well-oiled intelligence machinery. At any rate, the organizational base that the RSS was able to develop in the region, moderate as it was, helped it grow further in Rajasthan in the post-Independence period, even as it paved the way for the emergence of political organizations espousing the cause of Hindu Sanghatanist movement.

The RSS activity in Madras was still at a low ebb. The presence of the RSS in the Presidency was rather recent and its activities were mainly confined to opening branches and enlisting members, while training in drills and use of spears was also given. That there was defiance of the ban on drilling, etc. is also evident by the express orders given to the district-authorities to enforce the ban more strictly.⁴⁴

Bombay had traditionally been a stronghold of the RSS next only to C.P. During 1943, its membership in the Presidency was on the increase. The government reports of the period, however, ruled out any immediate danger and considered the existing ban on drilling, etc. to be sufficient to contain the RSS activities.⁴⁵

Bihar was another province where the RSS was consolidating its position, while the government was trying to contain it. By 1943, it covered, 11 districts, all lying in North Bihar. Apart from the district branches, there were 30mofussil branches.⁴⁶ The ban on uniforms and drills was often flouted. Students were seen vigorously participating in the Sangh activities. Nevertheless, the provincial government did not demand additional measures to face the growing menace.⁴⁷

It was from the Government of Central Provinces and Berar that the most shocking reports (from the government's point of view) were coming. In the British perception, the RSS had emerged here as a serious threat, which needed to be tackled with urgency. It was believed that 'the time has come for the suppression of the, militant activities of the Sangh', and that the existing restrictions had failed to do so.⁴⁸ It was argued by the provincial government that ‘a firmer policy is now necessary’ in view of the fact that ‘as the issue between Moslem and Hindu become clearer and more proximate the potential danger of the Sangh will increase’.⁴⁹ The circumvention of the ban, the government believed, was due to a lack of precision, which could be done away with by putting a blanket ban on all kinds of camps, uniforms and drilling.⁵⁰

This recommendation of a blanket ban gave rise to an intense debate in the government circles. It was argued by the Central Government officials that a ban on the camp, which was the centre of all activity, would be sufficient to control the RSS.⁵¹ Also, there was a lot of controversy on whether or not the Sangh was a political organization.⁵² As reflected in its records, the government on its part had no doubt whatsoever about the political nature of the Sangh. However, the RSS continued to focus primarily on organization of the society through cultural and social activities and to deny that it had anything to do with politics. It appears that the government and the Sangh had each a different notion of politics. Whereas the government considered power and struggle for it as the central feature of politics, for the RSS, politics had more to do with constitutionalism. In any case, the RSS activities during the Quit India Movement and later certainly had an important role to play in the power struggle in India and paved the ground for a bigger role at the time of the Partition.

The RSS continued to flourish in 1944. That it had become a force to reckon with even in Madras is evident by the orders issued by the Chief Secretary, Government of Madras to all District Magistrates conveying the suggestion of the Government of India that ‘continued vigilance is necessary against any volunteer organization that shows signs of developing into a private army’.⁵³ In Andhra Pradesh that year, Officers Training Camp at Belgaum was attended by 250 volunteers – a considerable number from the government's point of view.⁵⁴ What is even more important to note is that the volunteers from as far as Karnataka and Tamil Nadu came to attend the camp.⁵⁵ In this camp, the ban on uniforms and drilling was scrupulously followed, but training was given in a number of martial games like tug of war, nose tag, naughty move, hunch back, cock fight, roaming tiger, and police and thief.⁵⁶ Physical training was interspersed with the ideological one. On 2nd May, 1944, Golwalkar told his audience that 'the Hindus are the only nationals of Hindustan'. He exhorted the volunteers to 'work with one ideal, one way, one heart, one expression and all at the disposal of one leader'.⁵⁷ During the same camp, another speaker, Yadav Rao Joshe, declared the RSS resolve to defy all authority impeding its growth.⁵⁸

There were signs of defiance in other areas too. In Benaras, the Officers Training Camp attended by 400 volunteers witnessed the use of swords and daggers, leading to a clash with the district police. In this camp, Golwalkar is reported to have blamed the Congress for the lack of martial spirit in the Hindus. Freedom, he asserted, comes only by blood sacrifice, and the 'main object of the Sangh was to organize the Hindus generally, first to overcome the Muslims, and finally to oust the British'.⁵⁹ According to him, non-violence was only of tactical significance for the RSS, since premature violence would expose the organization to the danger of suppression. After two or three years, Golwalkar assured his volunteers, 'they will be able to fight their way to India's independence'.⁶⁰

The RSS was gaining ground in UP quite rapidly. Apart from the Benaras camp, there was another Training Camp at Aligarh in which 112 volunteers were reported to have participated.⁶¹ A separate Ten Days District Training Camp was held at Badaun.⁶² Besides, there was a 'First and Second Years Training Camp' at Meerut attended by a whopping 600 volunteers. In CP, 1944 was a successful year for the Sangh.⁶³ The three Officers Training Camps held at Nagpur, Akola, and Harda were attended by a total of 1,500 volunteers.⁶⁴ There were demonstrations in lathi-kathi, physical drill, and the usual games, but the ban on uniforms and military drill was abided by. In the Malabar district of Madras, there were five camps at Calicut alone.⁶⁵ In Sind, there were no Officers Training Camps as such, but according to the government reports, the Sangh was gaining in popularity.⁶⁶

All India Hindu Mahasabba:

Early in 1942, the President of the Hindu Mahasabha, Vinayak DamodarSavarkar, made a statement on the Pakistan demand. He conceded that the Hindus and the Muslims are two nations – as was being argued by the Muslim league. This, however, he added, was no bar to unity, as there could be several nations within a single unified state, once the political, cultural, social, and religious problems were resolved in an amicable manner.⁶⁷ Savarkar laid out four principles as the basis of unity and co-operation: territorial integrity of India, majority rule in provinces and centre, residuary powers in the centre, and recruitment to public services on merit alone.⁶⁸ The Savarkar line of argument did not have too many takers within the Hindu Mahasabha. Soon after Savarkar had given his statement, Moonje addressed a press conference in which he asserted that 'Muslims in India do not constitute a separate nation', that 'culturally, ethnologically and linguistically they are the same as the Hindus of Hindustan', and that they are 'only a religious community of India'.⁶⁹ Moonje concluded by saying that the Mahasabha was conscious of the need for protection of the Muslims and other minorities and agreed to provide it on the basis of the League of Nations formula.⁷⁰

Further modifications to the resolution were proposed by V.B. Gogte. He categorically declared:

Hindus alone are a nation in India and all the rest communities are minority communities ….There shall be only one state, secular in character, for the whole of India.⁷¹

In fact, the Mahasabha went a step further and demanded the British in 1942 to grant a national government, failing which they should be prepared for 'direct action' by the Mahasabha.⁷² During the same year, Moonje and other Mahasabha leaders were advising the Hindus to 'join the army in large numbers to learn the use of arms and tactics of war to be ready to defend India from the external aggression and internal rapacity of the Muslims'.⁷³ The Mahasabha also decried Gandhi's stance on Hindu-Muslim unity which, it argued, had emboldened Jinnah to press the Pakistan demand.⁷⁴ Hectic organizational work was set into motion to oppose the demand. The Mahasabha hostility to the Cripps proposals was quite in line with the national mood. The Japanese threat had already reached the borders of India, which prompted the Mahasabha into forming a 'Saurakshak Mandal' to assist the people in case of air raids.⁷⁵ In effect, however, the Mahasbha preparations were directed against the British too, for in an address to the Sangh volunteers, Moonje declared that 'Hindustan belonged to the Hindus and that it should be retaken from the British'.⁷⁶

The great Quit India disturbances were quelled by the British Government in a most dictatorial manner. This had provoked criticism from Indians of all shades and persuasions. The Hindu Mahasbha too expressed concern over the massive government suppression, but within the framework of its Hindu worldview. It declared:

The police repression of the Hindus in savagery and heinousness appears to be on par with that committed by Germany and Japan on the people of territories subjugated by them. ⁷⁷

The Mahasabha then decided to set up an enquiry committee to look into the excesses committed by the police.⁷⁸ Also, it condemned collective fines in no uncertain terms and alleged that the Hindus were being selectively victimized. The Hindus were called upon to 'resist the collection of such arbitrary and illegal exactions by all legitimate means'.⁷⁹

The Mahasabha opposition to the government was not confined to specific oppressive measures, such as collective fines, for in a resolution passed at a meeting of the Mahasabha held at Delhi from 29–31 August, it was asserted:

If the British government still persists in its policy of callous indifference to India's national aspirations and does not respond to this demand for the recognition of India's freedom and the formation of a National Government, the Hindu Mahasabha will have no other alternative but to revise its present programme to devise ways and means whereby Britain and her allies will realize that India as a self-respecting nation can no longer be suppressed.⁸⁰

In September 1942, SP Mukharjee reiterated the Mahasabha demand and warned the government that if it did not capitulate, 'civil disobedience' will be the only alternative left to the Mahasbha. However, he added, the civil disobedience organized by the Mahasabha will be different from that of the Congress and will not impede the government's war effort.⁸¹

The Mahasabha seems to have been aware of the limits of its politics, even before the Quit India Movement broke out, forcing it to take a definite position vis-a-vis India's independence. When at a meeting of the Bengal Provincial Hindu Mahasabha, Narain Das pressed for starting agitation against the government, irrespective of whether the Congress did so or not, he was discreetly reminded by Ashutosh Lahiri and others that the Congress was the leading political force in the country, without whose cooperation the Mahasabha campaign will become toothless⁸². Thereupon, the Bengal Sabha toned down its rhetoric and called upon the All India Hindu Mahasabha to 'revise its present policy and programme and devise ways and means to assert the birth right of India as a self-respecting nation'.⁸³

Not all the Mahasabha leaders agreed to this policy. In September 1942, Raja Narendra Nath wrote to Moonje reminding him that 'the object of the Hindu Mahasabhais to protect Hindu rights while the policy which you are now adopting, following in the footsteps of the Congress, is not likely to do so'.⁸⁴

The enquiry committee proposed by the Hindu Mahasabha became a flashpoint in its confrontation with the government. The Central Enquiry Committee comprised of Gauri Shankar Prasad, Ashutosh Lahiri, Ganga Ram Khanna, and Kunwar Chand Karan Sarda.⁸⁵ The provincial and district Sabhas were also instructed to form their own enquiry committees. The government interpreted the constitution of these committees as an open challenge to its authority. Immediately, it came into action to prevent the functioning of the committees.⁸⁶ By December 1942, however, there were few provincial and district committees, and we do not have any further information on whether they were at all constituted.

It cannot be gainsaid that the Mahasabha, like other political organizations in the country, was sensitive to the national aspirations. In fact, the government, on its part, believed that the Mahasabha was trying its best to internationalize the issue of Indian independence. What gave rise to such speculations was mainly the two telegrams sent by the Mahasabha to Roosevelt – the American President – and Chiang Kai Chek– the Chinese President. The content of the telegrams is identical and deserves to be quoted at length. Here, the Mahasabha demanded that pressure be put on the British:

to transfer power to Indian people and to set up a National Government for mobilising the national will for fighting the common enemy. British official attitude is mainly responsible for the Indian deadlock which has been intensified by the refusal of Viceroy to allow us to see Mahatma Gandhi. Mr. Churchill's recent speech in the House of Commons has made the stalemate worse. Mere repression is no remedy …..Hindu Mahasabha urges upon you to intervene for immediate formation of National government broad-based on goodwill of Indians and declaration of Indian independence⁸⁷.

The government was alarmed enough to clamp censorship on telegrams going abroad.

Late in 1942, the Hindu Mahasabha made a bold but unsuccessful attempt to broadbase its politics, when it propped up a new organization – All India Hindu Forward Bloc. At the very outset, the Bloc made it clear that it 'considered everybody a Hindu who had complete faith in the 10 principles of Manava Dharma’. A small booklet on Manava Dharma was brought out. The author here declared:

It is transparent to me that the aim of all religions which have originated during the last five thousand years, has been to lead the entire mankind to one path, one religion.⁸⁸

He exhorted mankind to have faith in the ethical principles of Manava Dharma and held the Maulvi, the Pandit, and the clergymen responsible for widespread disenchantment with religion⁸⁹. In the end, he declared that the foundation of all religions is truth and that truth alone is man's duty. Manava Dharma, therefore boiled down to truth.⁹⁰

By November 1942, 60 members had joined the Bloc. Branches of the Bloc were opened in Bombay and Sind. The Bombay Provincial Branch, under the leadership of Khandelwal, tried to mop up support, but its efforts came a cropper. A similar fate overtook the Sind Provincial Branch too. Thus, the Bloc which had often expressed the idea of organizing the Hindu Mahasabha on the principles of 'pure nationalism' died a premature death, without explaining, unfortunately, what it meant by 'pure nationalism'.⁹¹

The Mahasabha, with its avowed aim of protecting the Hindu culture and religion from invasion and extinction, took an active part in the traditional cultural activities. In August 1943, the Mahasabha Working Committee approved the plan of celebrating the Vikram Jayanti all over India in the memory of this great Indian hero of yore.⁹² Hindi, Hindu, Hindustan, one of the chief planks of the Mahasabha for a long time now, was being seriously called into question by the activities of Sir Mirza Ismail, the Prime Minister of Jaipur. The Mirza had made Urdu compulsory in the state services. Taking exception to this, the Mahasabha declared:

This Sabha warns Sir Mirza Ismail to change the anti-Hindu policy and urges upon the Maharaja to remove Sir Mirza Ismail from the premiership of the Hindu state.⁹³

On the eve of the 1943 elections to the Legislative Assembly, the Mahasabha reiterated its opposition to the Pakistan demand, and declared that as and when any proposal for Pakistan comes up in the legislatures, it would be opposed by the Sabha members.⁹⁴ The Mahasabha also expressed its serious concern over the largescale migration of the Bengali Muslims into Assam, and demanded that the Hindus should also be allowed to settle in the areas of their choice.⁹⁵ Regarding the Muslim agitations for additional weightage in Hindu states, the Mahasabha made it clear that it would strongly oppose any concessions to the Muslims.

Thus, the Mahasabha was deeply involved in the Hindu-Muslim politics of the day. This, however, was not its sole area of interest. The Bengal famine of 1943 prompted the Mahasabha to demand that 'supply of food grains to Bengal and other deficit provinces must be regarded as an important war measure'.⁹⁶ It condemned the Bengal Ministry for playing a partisan role in relief measures, and reminded the British Government that it is the 'elementary responsibility of any civilized government to feed its people.⁹⁷

Towards the close of 1943, a Mahasabha procession at Amritsar was lathi-charged by the police, eliciting strong protest from the Sabha members of the Legislative Assembly. Yuvaraj Dutta Singh raised a question in the Assembly, demanding the government to explain as to why the authorities resorted to a violent suppression of peaceful activities. The question was, however, disallowed on the ground that it did not concern the Governor-General in Council but the Punjab Government.⁹⁸

CONCLUSION:

There can be no denying the fact that during the period 1942-44 the RSS and Hindu Mahasabha received a strong impetus for growth and consolidation. The phenomenal rise of the Muslim League, which was threatening to tear apart the fabric of the Indian nation with its demand for a separate Muslim homeland, Pakistan, the banning of the INC coupled with incarceration of its entire leadership, and the unstable social and economic conditions created by the Second World War could be regarded as the principal factors behind their increasing appeal and expansion.The government's concern over the military aspect of the RSS was, of course, a manifestation of the intrinsic character of an alien state, primarily because of which thegovernment refrained from believing that the two were purely Hindu communal organizations pitted against the Muslim League. Rather, it seems to have believed that the two could be as much a threat to the British as to the League. Hence the insistence on containing military training. However, the colonial state was also a victim of its own nature. Being a modern hegemonic state, it could not afford to simply suppress the RSS and the Hindu Mahasabha.

REFERENCE:

1. Twards Freedom: Documents on the Movement for Independence in India 1943-44, Part III, edited by Partha Sarthi Gupta, Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1997; Home Department – File No. 28/3/43-Home Poll., p.2973

2. Ibid., p.2989, Government of C.P. and Berar Pol.and Mil. Dept., File No.207 (Madhya Pradesh Secretariat Record)

3. Ibid., p.2991

4. Ibid.,p.2996

5. Ibid., p.3005, D.O. No. C-73, dated Khandwa, the 2th December, 1942, from the Deputy Commissioner, Nimar

6. Ibid.,p.3010, Con. No. 12, dated camp Gondia, the 13^th January 1948, from the Deputy Commissioner Bhandara

7. Ibid.,p.3020, No.42-C, dated Amroati Camp, the 12^th January 1948, from Deputy Commissioner Amroati

8. Ibid.,p.3036

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.,p.3037

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.,p.3046, Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh, 1942.

14. Ibid.,p.3048

15. Ibid.,p.3049, Miscellaneous special branch reports on the RSS and Hindu Mahasabha, 1942.

16. Ibid.,p.3052, Summary of a report on the officers’ training camp of RSS. April-May 1942, Poona

17. Ibid.,p.3062, File No. 28/3/43- Home Poll (I)

18. Ibid.,p.3063

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.,p.3063, File No.28/3/43- Home Poll (I)

21. Ibid

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.,pp.3063-64

24. Ibid., p.3062

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.,pp.3067-3069, File No. 28/3/43- Home Poll (I)

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.,p.3092, File No. 28/3/43- Home Poll (I) National Archives of India (NAI)

29. Ibid.,p.3093

30. Ibid.,p.3094

31. Ibid.,p.3097, File No. 8/3/43- Home Poll (I)

32. Ibid

33. Ibid

34. Ibid

35. Ibid.,p.3098

36. Ibid

37. Ibid

38. Ibid

39. Ibid.,p.3098, File No. 8/3/43- Home Poll (I)

40. Ibid

41. Ibid

42. Ibid

43. Ibid.,pp.3191-97, File No. 28/3/43- Home Poll (I)

44. Ibid.,p.3100

45. Ibid.,p.3108

46. Ibid.,p.3113, File No.28/2/43- Home Poll (I)

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.,p.3122, File No. 28/3/43- Home Poll (I)

49. Ibid.,p.3123

50. Ibid.

51. Ibid., pp.3191-97, File No. 28/3/43- Home Poll (I)

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.,p.3160, Government of Madras, U.S. Files- File No.56/1943 (TNA)

54. Ibid.,p.3180

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.,p.3181

57. Ibid.,p.3182

58. Ibid.,p.3184

59. Ibid.,p.3218, File No.28/3/43-Home Poll (I)

60. Ibid.,p.3219

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid.,p.3220

65. Ibid.,p.3221

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid., p. 2976, Report in “The Hindu” dated 17.8.43 (ICWA Library)

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.,p.2979, Moonje Papers, File No.67 (NMML)

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid.,p.2986

72. Ibid.,p.3034, Govt. of C.P. and Berar Pol. and Mil. Dept., File No. 207 (Madhya Pradesh Secretariat records)

73. Ibid.,p.3039

74. Ibid.

75. Ibid.,p.3040

76. Ibid.,p.3041

77. Department of Home-political Files. F.No. 3/53/42, Poll 7, N.A.I

78. Ibid., p.2

79. Ibid.

80. Ibid.,p.7

81. Ibid.

82. Ibid.,p.8

83. Ibid.

84. Ibid.

85. Ibid.,p.5

86. Ibid., p.20

87. F.No.20/4/43. Poll (I) (N.A.I)

88. F.No.9/4/43. Poll (I) N.A.I

89. Ibid.

90. Ibid.

91. File No.9/15/43-Poll (I) N.A.I p.5

92. Ibid.

93. Ibid., p.9.

94. Ibid., p.10.

95. Ibid., p.11

96. Ibid.

97. F.No.8/2/44 Poll (I) N.A.I

98. Ibid.

Received on 06.06.2018 Modified on 18.07.2018

Res. J. Humanities and Social Sciences. 2018; 9(3): 663-670.

DOI: 10.5958/2321-5828.2018.00111.0