The Federal
Administration Permeating the West Cameroon Local Government System in a
Reunited Cameroon 1961-1972
Tem Protus Mbeum
Holds a PhD in
Economic and Social History and Lectures History at the Catholic University of
Cameroon, (CATUC) Bamenda and the Bamenda
University of Science and Technology (BUST)
ABSTRACT:
The reunification
of Cameroon and institution of a federation in 1961 laid the foundation for
differences between the federal authorities and the state of West Cameroon
which did everything possible to jealously preserve the Anglo-Saxon culture
inherited from the British. With West Cameroonians initially in favour of a federation and the granting of autonomy to the
states and their French counterparts in support of a centralised
system of government, problems soon erupted especially in Local Governments
that were well entrenched in West Cameroon. It is because of these
discrepancies that the paper explores changes witnessed by LG units in West Cameroon
between 1961 and 1972. Using archival and published sources and the thematic,
chronological and qualitative approaches in analysing
data, the study depicts that reunification catalysed
changes in the structure and administrative organisation,
municipal electoral system, representation and composition and the autonomy as
well as authority enjoyed by these institutions in West Cameroon vis a vis the
federal officials. It concludes that for there to be any meaningful drive in
the decentralisation process currently going on in
Cameroon, empowering the locals through representation and granting them full
autonomy in the management of local affairs is prerequisite for development.
KEY WORDS: Federal
Administration, Permeating, West Cameroon
INTRODUCTION :
The colonisation
of Africa led to the creation of political units which became the foundations
of modern African states and the inherited languages and cultures shaped these
states and set the direction that had to be taken in nation building.1
In Cameroon, the reunification of the territory between the former British and
French colonies made matters worse as the first experiment in bringing two
colonial cultures together in Africa soon became a source of conflict in the
new state. Though they retained their legal, educational, political and
administrative systems as well as a strong attachment to the languages and
cultures of their colonial masters, the formation of the federation that was
dominated by East Cameroonians was looked upon as a necessity and an
unavoidable stage in the institution of a unitary and centralised
state in Cameroon by Ahidjo.2
According to Weiner, there was
no possibility that real reunification would have taken place for any move
towards the entrenchment of administrative and political centralisation
would have led to cracks in the union as West Cameroon would never had
given up their distinctive culture and even demand for secession.3
Hence, there was no genuine union between the two states and Ahijdo only favoured a temporary
political organisation that would give West
Cameroonians hope that their colonial heritage would not be ignored in a
bicultural state.4 This therefore indicated that any form of organisation established in 1961was temporary and it was
not surprising that moves were taken at centralising
authority by the central administration of the new state. This had a great
impact on the Local Government (LG)system in West Cameroon that was the epicentre of the administration and rundown West Cameroon
administrative autonomy both at the state and LG levels.5
Misgivings were therefore a
characteristic feature of the federation especially among West Cameroonians as
the influence of East Cameroon’s colonial inherited culture was continuously
felt but not such that could not be resisted by the former.6 In
spite of the struggle to maintain West Cameroon identity especially in the
administrative and political spheres, Ahidjo’s
convictions for a united country and centralised
government triumphed between 1961 and 1972 though gradually.
It was because of this
move towards centralisation that Ahidjo
did all he could to limit any opposition to his schemes especially in West
Cameroon where multiparty politics was strong and opposition parties were well
entrenched and could withstand such schemes and preserve their inherited
Anglo-Saxon tradition. For him to succeed all political parties in the
territory were dissolved in favour of the Cameroon
National Union (CNU) and by 1966, Cameroon had become a one party state.7
This impacted negatively on West Cameroon’s administrative and political system
as well as its autonomy as Ahidjo became the all
powerful leader of the party and the federation.8
Without any opposing party and
holding the trump card, he replaced A. N. Jua who was
considered a strong proponent of federalism in 1967 single handily without
consulting the West Cameroon parliament. Furthermore, in 1969, he modified the
constitution and it became the absolute prerogative of the President to choose
the Prime Ministers of the states rather than their parliaments. The
constitutional revision culminated in power changing hands in West Cameroon
between Foncha who was a unitarist
and Muna, a federalist, and considered Ahidjo’s man in 1970. Unconstitutionally, the latter held
the post of Prime Minister and the Federal Vice President. Effectively elbowing
out those he thought were against his unification scheme and the merger of the
two colonial cultures, Ahidjo went ahead to call for
a referendum for the unification of Cameroon in 1972 and succeeded in
establishing a unitary state.9
The validation of Ahidjo’s request by the populace completely endorsed his
earlier attempts at centralising authority to the
detriment of the West Cameroon LG system in the period of the federation.
Imbued with a lot of powers and authority over local affairs when compared to
the same institutions in East Cameroon, the reunification of the territory
brought changes that greatly limited the authority of these institutions. The
independence hitherto enjoyed before independence were gradually eroded leading
to conflicts between the West Cameroon Government in general and these
institutions in particular.
It is as a result of Ahidjo’s centralisation schemes
that the paper discusses the influence of the federal administration on these
institutions and resistances put up by the West Cameroon authorities. Though
wide and varied, focus will be on the structure and organisation,
selection of legislatures, and authority of these establishments in the face of
duality of functions enjoyed by federal administrators in West Cameroon. Before
moving into the crux of the matter, it is necessary to discuss the making of
the reunited Republic of Cameroon and the LG system in British Southern
Cameroons in order to facilitate understanding of the influences reunification
had on West Cameroon LGs.
The Move towards
Reunification:
The Germano
– Douala treaty of 1884 established the territory that came to be known as the Kamerun, a German protectorate. With the outbreak of World
War I in Europe and its extension into Africa, British and French forces sent
out the Germans from Kamerun. The capitulation of
Douala, Buea and Yaounde in
September 1914 and in January 1916 respectively, signalled
an end to German rule in Cameroon.10
The fall of Douala immediately
saw the genesis of a joint administration for the territory and the
Anglo-French condominium remained in force until the 4th of March 1916.11
This joint administration was terminated just barely two years of its existence
as the territory was partitioned between the French and British who took
432.000sq.km and 88.000sq.km respectively.12 Such an administrative
division of the territory was only temporary. In May 1919, the Supreme Council
of the League of Nations gave the formal German colonies to their conquerors.
Article 119 part I of the treaty of Versailles came in to confirm the British
and French authorities over their respective spheres.13 By this,
they were to determine the status of their respective territories.14
In this regard, Henri Simon,
the French minister for colonies, met his British counterpart, Lord Alfred
Milner, in London and the partitioning line was upheld on the 10 of July 1919.
In July 1922, the Supreme Council confirmed the status of the two territories
as mandate ‘B’ territories.15 With these, the Mandate Commission
assigned the mandatory powers to foster, “Peace, order and good government of
their territories and for the promotion, to the utmost of the material and
moral well being and social progress of its inhabitants”.16 As such,
they had to ensure the socio-economic and political developments of their
territories as separate entities. After the Second World War and the creation
of the United Nations Organisation (UNO), the
Trusteeship Council did not remove the authority enjoyed by the French and
British over the territories as they were again entrusted to them.17
However, with the rise of
nationalism and the quest for independence, political leaders of British and
French Cameroons clamoured for a return to the pre
1916 political organisation of the territory. They
did not cherish the colonial boundaries instituted by the colonialists in 1916
and called for the reunification of the British and French Cameroons. This was
facilitated by the historical links, memories, familiarity and ethnic
uniqueness enjoyed under the German colonial period. These historical
reminiscences minimised the differences brought in by
the two colonial systems and the resultant effect was the reunification of
Cameroon.18
The separation of ethnic
groups along the present day regions of the North West and West, the South West
and West as well as the Littoral and the South West divorced people from the
same ethnic backgrounds, families, groups and also led to trade and customs
restrictions on both sides of the border which were not welcomed by the people
as they yearned for the German colonial era when they were one.
All these factors played into
the politics of reunification as the UPC championed the course after its
creation in 1948. This was again welcomed by Endely’s
Kamerun National Union in 1953, though it abandoned
it later to be embraced by Foncha’s Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP). With the banning
of UPC in French Cameroon, Ahidjo’s Union Cameroonaise became the dominant political party in
East Cameroon and piloted this territory into reunifying with West Cameroon.
This would not have been possible if Foncha’s KNDP
that was in power in West Cameroon never heeded. It is as a result of the
ideologies of these two parties that their leaders, Foncha
and Ahidjo, impressed on the UNO to forge a unity of
the two territories.
Disagreements between the
British Cameroon politicians on whether to seek autonomy, integration with
Nigeria or reunification with East Cameroon upon independence necessitated the
holding of a plebiscite for the people to decide their fate upon independence.
This was sanctioned by the UNO and on the 11 of February 1961, Cameroonians
went to the polls and were to choose between two questions which were; Do you
wish to achieve independence by joining the independent Federation of Nigeria?
OR Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the independent Republic of
Cameroun? The results worked in favour of
reunification with 233,511 votes for the second option and 97,741 for the
first.19
In preparation for the final
face of reunification, constitutional talks were held at Foumban
from 17 to 21 July 1961 and ended up with a federal constitution that ushered
in a federal Cameroon made up of two states. The former British territory was
renamed West Cameroon and former French colony (La République),
East Cameroon. On 1 October 1961 West Cameroon became independent and reunified
with East Cameroon and the Federal Republic was born. In the Union, West
Cameroon maintained its system of Local Governance inherited form the British
and worked hard to preserve it even though moves were made by the federal
authorities in infringing on the functioning, structure and organisation
and electoral processes of the system.
Local Government System in
West Cameroon:
The Local Government system in
West Cameroon was guided by the Indirect Rule (IR) Policy of the British that
was introduced into the territory in 1916. This favoured
the devolving of power to local authorities or Chiefs who lorded over local
councils and functioned as LGs. This policy was first proposed by the
Royal Niger Company and this was to rule Africa through existing authorities
and fill up the gap in its lack of effective authority. However, it was only an
administrative theory.20
Lord Lugard
who had worked for the company in 1894 and later in Uganda and India as a colonial
administrator developed the policy into an effective form of government.21
Though Lugard is credited for this policy, effort
were made at training and using the indigenes in the administration and by
colonial administrators and this was first explored by Sir Arthur Gordon in
Fiji between 1874 and 1880.22 Other West African Governors also
tried this. However, nowhere in the British colonies was it implemented with
such novelty as it was done by Lugard in Northern
Nigeria. Therefore, the Fulani Emirates of Northern Nigeria provided an
excellent avenue for the colonial experience to the British.23
The British therefore
envisaged a policy where Africans ruled by their chiefs and elders under
British administrators would encourage political and economic development.24
The British believed that through the Chiefs, the local administration, Native
Authority (NA), will be developed into an efficient organ of modern government.25
The NAs were to be the rudiment or embryo of LG and through this a post
colonial system would eventually emerge. The British also thought that natural
feelings would be raised through the NAs and chiefs and Councils were to learn
from these institutions the techniques in the running and management of
regional affairs. Their duties and obligations were laid down in the 1916 NA
Ordinance.26
NAs obligations also extended
to the collection of taxes as per the Native Revenue Ordinance.27
This recognised the chiefs as the principal tax
collectors. Part of this money was put in the Divisional or general treasury
and the rest went into local projects. The NAs were supervised by the British
officials who advised local authorities especially in matters of finance and
legal procedures.
The Native courts were also a
component of the Native Administration or local authorities.28 Such
courts were directed by the 1914 Native Court Ordinance. This went operational
in Nigeria in 1914 and was transferred to the Cameroons by the 10 of June 1916.
The Native Court Ordinance safeguarded the Chiefs’ positions as they did not
only serve as legislators and tax collectors within their NAs but as judges in
the Native Courts. These native tribunals with the powers of arrest also saw
their duties extended to the maintenance of order.29 These were set
up by the Resident and approved by the Lieutenant Governor.30
The NAs could appoint and
dismiss subordinate chiefs and officials. Such moves could only be sanctioned
by the Governor. They could appoint Native police to help in the executions of
their orders. The British made sure that the independence of the courts were
maintained and did everything possible to prevent administrators taking over
the roles of traditional rulers in this direction.31
This administrative system/organisation worked so well in Northern Nigeria that the
British thought they had discovered the secret of ruling Africans and was
exported to all British colonial dominions in general and Southern Cameroons in
Particular. It was introduced into Northern Nigeria in 1900 and when the
British took over the administration of the Southern Cameroons, it became part
and parcel of the Nigerian protectorate. Immediately, the IR system became the
guiding principles in the day to day running of the territory.
By 1939, the NA rule was no
longer at pace with developments in the protectorate. The educated elite and
returning soldiers from the Second World War were no longer at ease with the
system and pressed for reforms. With this, the authorities could no longer
remain indifferent to their demands and looked on to LGs as the best means
through which the central government could be extended and the broadening of
representation to include all sectors of society.32 The NA system
had failed to satisfy the middle class and there was the need for reform.
This therefore led to the
reformation of the system and the creation of bigger and viable units imbued
with more authority and independence in the management of local affairs. As a
result, the territory was reorganised and two
provinces were created in 1949, (the Cameroons and the Bamenda).
In the Bamenda Division, three new administrative
units were the outcome, that is, Bamenda, Nkambe and Wum and in the
Cameroons Division, Victoria, Kumba, and Mamfe These bigger units became higher tiers of LG and
representation was drawn from the clans which were also recognised
as lower tiers of LG and became embryos to the Divisional councils
created in 1949. This organisation remained in force
until 1961 when the territory reunited with La République
du Cameroun.
Reunification and the Changing
Tides of Representation:
The reorganisation
of West Cameroon LGs in 1949 saw the democratisation
of councils whereby membership was not limited to natural rulers or elders as
it held before this period. Untitled literate men, women and unrepresented
ethnic groups like the Fulani and Hausas were made part and parcels of these
institutions. However, with reunification and changes in the administrative set
up of the territory, efforts were made at discarding the membership of
traditional rulers and special interest groups in the LG institutions. The West
Cameroon government worked very hard to make sure that natural rulers were
represented as well as special interests groups that were not taken care of in
the Specification of Compositions. This was not favoured
by the federal government. It was the policy of the British colonial
authorities and continued by the West Cameroon Government that all groups in
the territory had to be accorded representation in the management of local
affairs.
The struggle for the
preservation of the representation of traditional rulers was not new as many
colonial administrators had grabbled with the problem of eliminating their
representation without success. A good example was Griffith, DO for Wum Division, who believed that though they wielded so much
power and prestige, their powers were no longer the same as in the early years
of the British colonial experience on Africa.33 Many changes had set
in. Their powers in the days of old were derived from or confined on spiritual
rather than temporal powers. This had a serious impact as many Africans
believed their existence depended on the chiefs that wielded society together
and their security and socio-economic wellbeing was tied down to them. With the
extermination of tribal wars and other changes, this became a myth to many who
believed that they were no longer indispensable.
Such an argument was not
welcomed by the Resident for Bamenda Province who
stated categorically that Griffith’s claims was over exaggerated and saw
traditional rulers as a people ready and able to undertake greater
responsibilities. Though a majority of them were illiterates, the small numbers
of literates were coming on stronger and stronger and were of great help to the
administration, he insinuated. He felt that with time, efficiency would come.34
He held that, their departure
from the political scene was not going to be immediate. It was unrealistic to
exclude them entirely because some of them were intelligent and many of their
subjects still respected and cherished their position’s prestige. It was
necessary therefore to keep some of them in the council to provide […]
stability…which is best given by the presence of the senior men… whose position
in the social hierarchy gives them respect and procedure over others even if by
the consideration of character alone they do not deserve it.35
Though undesirable, they could
not be excluded from the councils for they knew the history and methods that
could be helpful in the promotion of the progress of the clan without any
difficulty. In the Bamenda Conference of DOs of
November 1956, the Resident called for the continuous presence of natural
rulers in the LG councils. They were still very important in the political set
up and no reform was to ignore them.36 Such a policy was not
discontinued by the West Cameroon government after reunification as they did
everything they could to preserve the uniqueness of this institution.
Even when the CNU government
came in 1966, the Fons of Bali, Bafut,
Fontem, Kom, and Nso were made the natural presidents of their various
councils. Special groups too were not neglected as they continued to be
represented as seen in minority interests like the Fulani and Hausa in the
Grasslands and other foreign entities elsewhere.37
However in the 1968 elections organised by the federal government all over the territory,
the chiefs and special interest groups were not taken care of and the PM of
West Cameroon never took this lightly. These natural rulers had and remained
very important as they played useful functions in the administration of their
areas. These extended to community development, collection of taxes, issues of
land and were arbiters of customs and conciliation of civil disputes. In short,
they were a link between the people and the government and the PM made it clear
that their presence was needed in the councils.38 To him, their
presence provided at the LG level for local democratic balance and maintaining
this social setting was necessary so that the peoples’ known and recognised tradition that has survived the test of time for
generations grows in democracy.39
None Cameroonian interests
groups like Nigerian traders and commercial vehicle owners also contributed to
the economy of their host councils through taxation. In the forest region of
West Cameroon, in Ndian, fishermen of Nigeria origin
contributed greatly to the finances of that area. Without them, the finances of
the council area would have been in jeopardy. In Bamusso,
none natives outnumbered the indigenes. In the Grassland region, the Fulani
were present. They were cattle owners and traders and had lived in the area for
long and regarded Cameroon as their fatherland and were concerned with the
development of their areas.
Taxation without
representation had been frowned upon by the British colonial authorities in the
Grassfields in the 1950s who argued that this would
be disastrous to the finances of the area. According to Preston Potts, DO for
the Bamenda Division, this scenario would not be
satisfactory.40 Illustrating from the Nigerian protectorate where
pocket resistances had often occurred, where in 1895, five thousand people
demonstrated against the arbitrary imposition of the land and house tax in
Lagos and the British were forced to revoke it.41 Similar
disturbances had occurred in Abba after the introduction of Poll tax in 1929
with violence orchestrated by women. With these, he argued that, councils’
representation should have a direct relation to the electorate and tax payers
were to have a leading voice though other groups and sub groups were also to be
accorded representations. No matter how small each village was it had to be
represented in the clan council at least.
This was to ensure corporation
of the electorate and adequate representation. This remained the best means
available and also satisfactorily too.42 Closing up the gap between
the taxpayers theoretically who was at the periphery and the local legislature
at the centre was ideal. The most pressing problem of the councils was not
administrative but financial. It was therefore necessary to carry out reforms
that will ensure and initiate extra sources of revenue and this was best
through the co – opting of more tax payers and winning their confidence through
the local council. In connection to this, women societies, Fulani, Hausa and
other sub groups were to be the principal focus.43
As such, it was therefore not
logical for the Federal Government to refuse them representation in 1968. They
paid a substantial amount of the taxes. It was unfair to keep them completely
out of council business as this would lead to the evasion of tax and community labour. This was necessary, especially as concerns the
Fulani, at a time when the government was working hard to implement cattle
control laws that were to minimise farmer grazer
problems in the Grassfields and Mamfe
Division.
Again, the financial
situations of the councils were not the best during this period. Confidence and
the participation of all in the set up were necessary if any success was to
come.44 There was the need for a country that has just united all
political forces for the sake of unity and development to embrace all sectors
of society. Such an embrace was to facilitate the channelling
of decisions to all groups in the political set ups. The PM of West Cameroon
therefore appealed to the Federal Ministry of Interior that these elements were
still desirable. It is in response to this plea that they were co-opted into
the various councils. Hence, it was based on the above prescriptions that
elections were held on June 30, 1968.45
In spite of the struggle put
up by the West Cameroon government, women were not granted any special status
representation as they were encouraged and call upon to take active part in
politics and in the democratisation of the territory.
Furthermore, Members of the House of Assembly or West Cameroon legislature
who became honorary members of LGs though without voting rights by 1956 lost
their seats in these institutions. This policy was continued after independence
as some of them were appointed into LGs legislatures by the Minister of
Interior but discontinued from 1968.46
Alteration of Administrative
Structures and Electoral Processes:
The reunification of Cameroon
facilitated the disappearance of the clan or subordinate councils in West
Cameroon which served as electoral colleges to Divisional LGs. Worthy of note
is that membership to the clan councils was to come from quarters and villages
of these clans.47 These were veritable instruments in the
development process especially in galvanising
community development.
They were forums through which
the voice of the people of the respective areas could be heard. Though they had
no deliberative or executive powers, they remained excellent mediums for the
dissemination of information from the federal councils to their clans. Their
opinion was so important so much so that Divisional Councils’ decisions could
only go operational with the approval of the clan councils or after their views
were sought.48 They even discussed points of the native law and
custom and made recommendation for its abolition or overhauling.49
This therefore meant that
their authority crisscrossed over a wide range of issues and recommendation had
to be made to the Divisional Council that had legislative powers. Again, they
were not to be hijacked by few individuals but the active participation of all
so that the areas’ opinions or recommendations really reflected the general
demands wishes and aspirations of their people. The clan councils remained the
only avenue through which men of integrity or deemed trustworthy and thought to
have any outside contact could be found.
However, reunification
destroyed this institution. In preparation for the 1966 LG elections, new
specifications of compositions and new rules guiding the tenures of those
elected were issued. It was realised that the
presence of many Subordinate NAs took a heavy toll on the councils’ finances as
it became more and more expensive to run them. As a result, these were
dissolved and membership to LGs was to be elected directly from the universal
suffrage.50 The voting age that was twenty five years for West
Cameroon was reduced to twenty one years and the term of councillors
moved from three to five years.
Besides, in 1968 the harmonisation of electoral laws of East and West Cameroon
took place. The list system was introduced from the latter into West Cameroon
LG electoral system.51 It meant that electoral participation was
limited to members of the CNU as only political parties could present lists for
elections into LG legislatures. It was a departure from the candidate centred election approach in West Cameroon. Introduced into
the territory in the 1964 election of federal parliamentarians, the West
Cameroon electoral officer, Asonganyi, made it clear
that elections where to be by list system and not by candidates as was
practiced in West Cameroon.52 From 1966, it was only the CNU party
to make nomination of candidates to any election as it was incumbent on
them as the sole political party in the country to do so as it held
in East Cameroon before then. This decision was again resounded by Jua, PM of West Cameroon, in 1967 who made it unambiguously
clear to West Cameroonians that the party was the only body that ensured the
proper selection of candidates for any election.53
This was in line with
the harmonised rules governing municipal elections in
Cameroon that came up the same year and reinforced by the Local Authority
Notice of 1968. This law affirmed that the submission of a list must be through
party officials and further talked of candidates having a declaration of
affiliation to a political party. It also posited that candidates were to be
aligned to a political party. Without any contradiction, the presence of only
one party in Cameroon therefore meant that dissenting voices or opposing
political voices were absent in LG legislatures in Cameroon. This was in line
with the goals of the reunification of political parties in Cameroon that was
aimed at making peace reign in the country and eliminate the past political
multi – political party frictions. This was also to ensure unity and encouraged
all in the territory to work together for the development of the Federal
Republic of Cameroon.54
These changes were in great
contradiction to what held in West Cameroon where multiparty politics triumphed
and representation from different political opinions was present in LG
legislatures. Furthermore, independent candidates even stood for elections in
West Cameroon. But in the new setup, only loyal party members were eligible for
elections.55 Hence, West Cameroon LGs which were imbued with a
multiplicity and diverse opinions of representations saw this lost in a
reunited Cameroon. Added to this, though the Prefets
were retained as returning officers just like the DOs in West Cameroon before
reunification, the party remained paramount and controlled the state of affairs
and determined who could run for elections. Administrators, thus, assisted the
party in the process and became very influential not only in party affairs but
also in the management of local communities as their competences cut across
federal and state affairs.
The Duality of Functions and
the Dominance of Federal Officials:
The SDOs and DOs before
reunification were the supervisory authorities of LGs. They supervised the
technical staffs of the various departments as well and those of LGs. They were
answerable to the Ministry of LG. They prepared NA estimates and were the authorising agents of LG’s expenditure except in cases that
needed technical experts like the medical and agricultural sectors.56
All these functions were to be based on their advisory capacities.
With Independence and
Reunification, they now had to control LG and Federal services within their
area of jurisdiction. This duality of functions made them answerable to the
Federal Ministry of Interior with regards to federal matters and Secretary of
State for LG in West Cameroon on matters concerning LG.57 Though
they were to remain as advisers to local authorities and take orders from the
LG Secretary in West Cameroon, they acted as overlords and suppress LG
officials and their representatives. Where LG authorities worked hard to
maintain the status quo that they inherited from the British, they were
constantly reminded that corporation was a necessity to development. Such lack
of cooperation caught the attention of the Secretary of State for Interior in
1967 who reminded all Councils of West Cameroon that:
[…] the prefects are
government representatives in charge of their divisions. They are automatically
in charge of council staff of all grades and status in their divisions. All
concerned are therefore required to cooperate so that the affairs of the
councils and those of council areas are properly guided and channelled
to profitable ends for the good of all the federated state of West Cameroon in
particular and the Federal Republic of Cameroon in general.58
The Councils were again
reminded of the 1965 DOs Conference in which the roles of the DOs were
enumerated and included; the attending of all Council meetings as well as those
of Committees, advisers, supervision of staff, preparation of Council and
Committees’ Agenda, comment and process on council minutes before transmitting
them to the Ministry, ensure good relations between councillors
and staff, between these two groups and the SDOs and DOs and between the whole
hierarchy.59
These powers were so great
that they could not be controlled by the LG authorities nor put to order when
at fault. When their duties were not dispensed properly or irregularities were
present, the Councils and LG Ministry was powerless. This was in great contradiction
to the Councils’ staff that could be disciplined by the West Cameroon LG
Service Commission whenever they failed in the discharge of their duties. Even
when the DOs and SDOs embezzled or mismanage Council money or authorised wasteful expenditure or that not found in the
estimates, he could not be surcharged by the Director of West Cameroon Audit
who did in the case of LG employee.60 LG now had to rely on the
Inspector of Administration of West Cameroon for any sanctions or action on
supervisory authorities, no matter how grievous the crime was. This made things
difficult as LG endeavours needed the sanctions of
the SDOs and DOs and even the Inspector of Administration before it could be
effective. Hence, the administrative organisation of
the unity state greatly limited the powers of the administrative regions in
general and local authorities in particular61 especially in West
Cameroon where the Inspector of Administration was a francophone and wielded
much power than the PM.
CONCLUSION:
The paper examined the
influence of reunification on the West Cameroon’s LG and it was realised that much harm was done to the system inherited
from the British colonial authorities. It revealed that the composition of LG
legislatures was transformed as the federal government sidelined special
interest groups contrary to what held in West Cameroon. Furthermore, it
eliminated membership status granted to parliamentarians as honorary members of
LG.
Reunification further
transformed the municipal electoral process of West Cameroon as it moved from
the candidate based to a list system approach that held in East Cameroon.
Finally, the findings also disclosed that reunification instituted a duality of
functions with regards to the SDOs and DOs and this not only undermined the
autonomy enjoyed by these local authorities but also alienated the control and
management of the institutions leading to conflicts between these
administrators and LGs. This also extended to the West Cameroon Ministry of LG
that controlled and managed them.
It as a result of these
problems and the delay in granting complete autonomy void of the frequent
interferences by the government officials to these authorities since 1972 that
the paper recommends that the decentralisation
process currently going on in the territory should be speeded up and real power
void of the interference of the central authorities or based elites granted
them. Further, representation should be accorded to all groups and the right to
participate in government irrespective of place of origin. If this is done,
progress that is always associated with LG will be witnessed in
Cameroon.
REFERENCE:
1.
Awasom 2004, p.87.
2.
Konning and Nyamnjoh 1997,
pp.207-209; Lee and Kenneth., p.3.
3.
Weiner 1965, p.107.
4.
Forge 1981, pp.52-64.
5. Johnson 1970, p.209.
6.
Eyongetah and Brian 1974, p.175.
7.
Gardinier 1963, pp.119-126.
8.
Lee and Kenneth, p.19.
9.
Joseph 1978, pp.88-89.
10. Brain and Palmer 1987, p.78.
11. Elango 1967, p.11.
12. Mbuagbaw et al, p.78.
13.
Colonial 1931, p.5.
14.
Chiabi 1989, p.195.
15. Ibid.
16. Mandate Agreement Cited in Ngoh (ed), 2004, p.1.
17. Awasom, 2006,
p.64.
18. Awasom
2003-2004, p.88-89.
19. Le Vine 1964, p.212.
20.
Flint 1966,p.150.
21.
Ibid.
22. Agbor. Federke, and Viegi, Available at
http://sites.google.com/site/juliusagbor/home, Accessed on 29 November,
2010.
23.
Miles 1994, p.92.
24.
Zamani, 1974, p.203.
25.
Anene and Brown 1961, p.318.
26.
National Archives Buea (NAB)
Ja/a(1916)1, 1916, p.2.
27.
Miles 1994, p.92.
28.
Chiabi, p.184.
29.
NAB Ja/a(1917) 1917, p.3.
30.
Colonial 1925, p.119.
31.
NAB Ja/a(1922)1, No.
793/1922 1928, p.27.
32.
NAB Jb/a (1967)2, No. CI.
1088, 1967, pp1-2.
33.
NAB E(1952)2, 1952, p.17.
34.
Ibid.
35.
Ibid.
36.
NAB Ja/g(1957)1, No. LG.
979, 1957, p.673.
37.
Ibid., p.330.
38.
NAB Ia(1959)2, LG 1903/S.1,
1959, p.10.
39.
NAB Ja/a(1968)2, CI 1125,
1968, p.330.
40.
NAB Ja/g(1956)6, 1957, p.7.
41.
Ademoyega 1962, p.3.
42.
NAB Ja/g(1956)5, 1956, p.17.
43.
NAB Ja/g(1956)5, 1956, p.17.
44.
NAB Ja/g(1968)3, CI 1139, 1968,
pp.3-4.
45.
NAB Ja/a(1968)2, No. CI
1125, p.103.
46.
Wum Divisional Archives (WDA) E(1987)28, No.
649/S.3/vol.1, 1987, P.11.
47.
NAB Ma/a(1949)2, No. 4405 Vol. I, 1949, p.335.
48.
NAB Cb(1953)1, 1953, p.9;
NAB, Ci(1950)1, No. 106, 1952, p.86.
49.
NAB Ja/g(1952)1, 1952,
p.135.
50.
NAB Jb/a(1967)2, p.4.
51.
NAB Ja/g(1968)2, 1968,
pp.37-44.
52. Cameroon Times, 2 April 1964,
Cited in Ewumbue-Monono, 2005, pp.41-42.
53. Ewumbue-Monono, 2005, p.44.
54.
Jb/a(1964)4, No. P1439, 1964, p.132.
55. Ewumbue-Monono, 2005, pp.86-88.
56.
NAB Jb/a(1966)1, No. AG21,
1966, p.12; NAB, Jb/a(1967)1, No. LGM/3, 1967,
p.68.
57.
Johnson, p.211.
58.
NAB Jb/a(1964)3, Lg.
1895/S.3, 1964, p.1.
59.
Ibid.
60.
NAB Jb/a(1966)1, No. AG21,
pp.12-13. Enonchong 1967, p.173.
Received on 19.08.2016
Modified on 14.03.2017
Accepted on 30.03.2017
© A&V Publications all right reserved
Research J. Humanities and Social Sciences. 8(1):
January - March, 2017, 43-51.
DOI: 10.5958/2321-5828.2017.00007.9