Naxalism and its impact in India

 

Dr. R.P. Saharia

 

Head Dept. of Economics, Govt. J.M.P. College Takhatpur, Bilaspur (C.G.)- 495001

 

 

ABSTRACT:

Naxalism is the most significant political movement since independence. It has been the most long lasting though it has had its ups and downs. Despite its fragmented nature a continuing thread with some variations can be seen in the ideological thrust, strategy and tactics of mobilization of different groups within its manifold. It is the only movement which having started in one police station of a single district in West Bengal in 1967 has expanded its activities covering over 460 police stations in 160 districts across 14 states despite the police force and infrastructure having grown manifold during this period. The movement is viewed with greater anxiety in the government because it is most intense precisely in areas which are rich in natural resources and, therefore, targeted for fast-track industrial development. The movement is also uniqe in that it tends to mobilize the most subdued and socially marginalized sections and lays bare, as probably no other movement has done, the sharp fissures in the society, politics and economy.

 

KEY WORDS:

 

INTRODUCTION:

The term Naxalites comes from Naxalbari, a small village in West Bengal, where a section of the communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPM) led by KanuSanyal, and JangalSanthal initiated a violent uprising in 1967. On May 18,1967, the Siliguri Kishan Sabha, of which Jangalwas the president, declared their support  for the movement initiated by Kanu Sanyal and readiness to adopt armed struggle to redistribute land to the landless. The following week, a sharecropper near Naxalbari village was attacked by the landlord’s men over a land dispute. On May 24, when a police team arrived to arrest the peasant leaders, it was ambushed by a group of tribals led by Jangal Santhal, and a police inspector was killed in a hail of arrows. This event encouraged many Santhal tribals and other poor people to join the movement and to start attacking local landlords. These conflicts go back to the failure of implementing the 5th and 9th Schedules of the Constitution of India. See Outlook India comment by E.N. Rammohan‘ Unleash the Good Force’ edition July 16, 2012. In theory these Schedules provided for a limited form of tribal autonomy with regard to exploiting natural resources on their lands, e.g. pharmaceutical and mining), and land ceiling laws, limiting the land to be possessed by landlords and distribution of excess land to landless farmers and labourers. The caste system is another important social aspect of these conflicts.

 

Mao Zedong provided ideological leadership for the Naxalbari movement, advocating that Indian peasants and lower class tribals overthrow the government and upper classes by force. A large number of urban elites were also attracted to the ideology, which spread through Majumdar’s writings, particularly the ‘Historic Eight Documents’ which formed the basis of Naxalite ideology.

 


In 1967, Naxalites organized the All India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR), and later broke away from CPM. Violent uprisings were organized in several parts of the country. In 1969, the AICCCR gave birth to the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (CPI(ML)). Practically all Naxalite groups trace their origin to the CPI (ML). A separate offshoot from the beginning was the Maoist Communist Centre, which evolved out of the Dakshin Desh group. The MCC later fused with the people’s War Group to form the Communist Party of India (Maoist). A third offshoot was that of the Andhra revolutionary communists, mainly represented by the UCCSI (ML), following the mass line legacy of T. Nagi Reddy, which broke with the AICCR at an early stage.

 

IDEOLOGY AND OBJECTIVES:

The Naxalite movement began principally on the foundations of an ‘agrarian struggle’ as encapsulated by the events at Naxalbari, West Bengal in 1967. Since then, the movement not only went through conflicts and organizational upheavals, the basic ideology and the objectives of the movement also took a different turn with the strengthening of the People’s War Group (PWG) in the late 90s. “In our agenda for a new democratic revolution, there are two aspects-the agrarian revolution and fight for nationality.”

 

Between 15-30 November 1995, the PW conducted an All India Special Conference in some unknown locality of Dandakaranya. There, it adopted two important party documents. The ‘party programme’ as adopted in the Conference reads, “India is a semi-feudal, semi-colonial society; here the New Democratic Revolution (NDR) has to be completed victoriously paving way to the Socialist Revolution and to advance towards the ultimate goal of Communism. The Indian people are weighed down by three big mountains: feudalism, imperialism and comprador bureaucrat capital; these are the targets to be overthrown in the present stage of NDR. The four major contradictions in the present-day Indian society are: the contradiction between feudalism and the broad masses; the contradiction between imperialism and the Indian people; the contradiction between capital and labour and the contradiction within the ruling classes. While the first two are fundamental contradictions to be resolved through the NDR, the contradiction between feudalism and the broad masses is the principal contradiction at the present stage. India is a multi-national country—a prison-house of nationalities and all the nationalities have the right to self-determination including secession. When NDR is victoriously completed, India will become a voluntary and genuine federation of all national people’s republics.”

 

The second document, which was adopted in the conference, was the document on the ‘Strategy and Tactics’. It reads, The political strategy to be pursued in the present stage of NDR in India is one of forming a broad united front  of all the anti-feudal, anti-imperialist forces—the working class, the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie—under the leadership of the working class to overthrow the common enemies—feudalism, imperialism and comprador bureaucratic capital. The military strategy or the path of Indian Revolution is the path of protracted people’s war i.e, liberating the countryside first through area wise seizure of power establishing guerilla zones and base areas and then encircling the cities and finally capturing power throughout the country. The unevenness in the economic, social and political development of Indian society calls for different  tactics i.e., forms of struggle and organization, to be to be pursued in different regions of the country, while the political tactic line throughout the country remains the same. In urban areas the political and mass work should be carried out observing utmost precaution and the organizational work should proceed keeping in view the long-range perspective. Caste is a peculiar problem in India; and appropriate forms of organization and struggle should be evolved vigorously to fight out untouchablility, caste discrimination and to finally root out the caste system. The  tactics of boycott of elections have to be pursued for a long time in the prevailing conditions in India; and participating in parliamentary and assembly elections under any pretext only weakens the class struggle. These two documents, containing different organizational aspects of PW, make a clear cut demarcation for the issues pertaining to organizational conflict between the Liberation and PW. However, during the 1990s the growth of militarization became the characteristic feature of the PWG. The formation of People’s Guerrilla Army (PGA), special guerrilla squads, Permanent Action Team (PAT) and Special Action Team (SAT) were the distinctive features of PWG activities for quite some time, before it merged with MCC to form the CPI (Maoist).

 

Causes and Determinants: Problem of Land Alienation

The Naxalite movement came into being as a result of prevailing social and economic issues. In fact, while conducting an enquiry into the uprising, the West Bengal State Secretariat of the CPI(M) stated, “Behind the peasant unrest in Naxalbari lies a deep social malady – malafide transfers, evictions and other anti-people actions of tea gardeners and jotedars,.” These issues were longstanding and there was no dearth of reform legislation. But the spirit of the law remained confined to paper and the people were left to languish. Therefore, it recognized that the causes were in essence, socio-economic.

 

After independence the Indian government started the protracted and difficult process of abolishing the Zamindari system, To eliminate the role of intermediaries. By the end of the 1950s, the process was completed on paper. This meant that 20 million erstwhile tenants were now landowners One rough estimate says that area under tenancy declined from 42% to around 20% by early 1960s However, to a large extent this was caused due to eviction of tenants by landlords and not by actual reform in the system. The next part of land reform was tenancy reform. Its objectives were to guarantee security of tenure to tenants, to ensure fair rent rates and to gain rights of ownership of land he/she cultivated, subjecttosome restrictions at well below market rates. In west Bengal, two major acts for land reform were passed in the 1950s aimed to eliminate intermediaries (zamindars and jotedars)  and bring fixed rent tenants into a direct relationship with the state. It gave the state powers to inquire into land transfers and cancel the transfer if it was not bona fide. Abolition of intermediaries was generally successful. However numerous loopholes and poor implementation meant that the landlords were able to retain control over large tracks of land. It did not protect the rights of Bargadars (sharecroppers), who were the most deprived section of society. From 1947 to 1969, as part of land reform implementation in west Bengal, only 300,000 acres of above-ceiling land was redistributed, a little less than 3% of the cropped land in the state. The 1961 census estimated that 82 percent of the tenancies in the country were insecure. Bargadars received no protection until 1970, when the government, woken from stupor by the Naxalbari  uprising amended the west Bengal land Reforms Act to cover them also. The legislations themselves were not strong enough and implementation was extremely ineffective.

 

Protection of Forest Land

The scheduled tribes and other traditional forest dwellers(Recognition of rights)  Act,2006 was enacted to douse the flames of widespread unrest among the tribes on account of their eviction from forest a major cause of the spread of naxalite movement. The government had announced that all title deeds in respect of occupations of forest land shall be distributed by the end of 2009. But the implementation of the Act is being frustrated by the forest bureaucracy. This is being done by continued eviction of the tribals  from their existing occupation of land their relocation from wild life sanctuaries and national parks without consent, notifying wild life sanctuaries prior to the implementation of the Act, taking over the functions of the forest rights committee by the forest officials, forcible plantation on land under cultivation of the tribals , ignoring  community rights, calling the gram Sabha  at the panchayat  level rather than at the village level etc. These violations of the provisions  of the act are vitiating the outcome of implementation process, thus defeating the objectives of the Act and frustrating the affected tribals. Besides, a number of environmentalists (proxy for the forest officials) have also filed writ petitions in various courts challenging the validity of the Act itself. If this drift is not checked, it would reinforce the feeling among the tribals that they cannot get justice from the system.

 

Denying the Rights of Tribals-Abuse of PESA: Panchayat (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act,1996

Why was PESA path breaking? In what manner did it mark a departure from earlier laws concerning tribal welfare and rights? PESA recongnized the Gram sabha to be pre-eminent as against the Gram Panchayat.  While the Gram panchayat was an elected body, the Gram sabha was much smaller group comprising of village elders of smaller.

Habitations or a group of hamlets. It is in this respect that PESA proved to be landmark legislation as it sought to transfer power directly in the hands of the smallest unit, the gram sabha. Under the PESA, the Gram sabha is empowered and has the following powers:

a.       The power to prevent alienation of land in the scheduled tribe areas and to take appropriate action to restore the land back to the scheduled tribe.

b.      The ownership of minor forest produces.

c.       The power of enforce prohibition, or to regulate consumption of liquor.

d.      The power to exercise control over money lending to the scheduled tribes.

e.       The power to control local plans and resources.

f.       The power of permission/recommendation in granting license or mining leases for minor minerals.

g.      The right to be consulted before any land acquisition.

h.      The power to issue certificate of utilization  for government works etc.

 

What we see here is that PESA empowers the smallest group, the Gram Sabha to exercise control and take decisions which may affect their lives directly. PESA in effect, has brought down governance right to the local level and at the same time recognizes  the Gram Sabha to be a competent authority to carry out certain decisions, without the involvement of mid-level government officers. PESA is a radical piece of legislation which seeks to shift the balance of power from the powerful elite and the state towards the local  tribal community. While the intent behind passing  PESA was pure, to implement it required certain capabilities that the state has failed deliver, thus neutralizing any positive effect PESA was intende to achieve.  

 

It is  a known fact that the land the tribal communities own, is rich in minerals and other natural resources a necessary fuel for sustaining the fast growing Indian economy and the thirst for large scale industries. This is where the conflict lies and the interest of a growing economy clashes with that of the local communities who have struggled against colonial forces historically and are now up against the mighty force of the Indian state and the powerful elite. As a result, India today is witnessing flash points across PESA areas. Acquisition of an individual’s or a community’s land and natural resources for private industry in violation of PESA is leading to conflicts and violent clashes. The consequence of such a development is further alienation of the tribal community from the mainstream. With every such injustice the Indian state loses the trust of these people and it is only inevitable that over a period of time, they see the violent methods of the CPI (maoist) as the only counter to the injustices meted out to them, in the absence of a caring state. Of late, the state itself has become the principal violator of tribal rights. Earlier while it committed acts of omission, today, the state administration is freely acquiring land, ignoring the recommendations of the Gram Sabha. It is to be noted here that many such meetings with the Gram Sabha is undertaken under huge police presence, thus not allowing a free and fair process to take place.

 

The enactment of PESA in 1996 led to large scale awareness among the tribals about their rights. The initial success also sought to heal the wounds of the past injustices and gave birth to hope for a better future. The passing of the Act also created a sense of expectation among the tribals from the Indian state, who would be their guardian and protector of their interests. With the onset of private capital, it brought with it displacement of communities, usage of forest resources without the consent of the locals and flouting of various provisions of PESA. When the Indian state failed to act as their “protector”, the tribals turned to violence and other extreme measures. It is interesting to note that out of the 76 Maoist affected districts in the country, 32 are PESA districts. As we saw earlier, the Maoist spread their influence in a particular district by taking up local issues concerning land rights, wages, natural resources etc. on behalf of the tribals. It is only at a much later stage after winning their trust that they unleash their military agenda and work to create dalams (village level militia). Abuse and neglect of PESA provides the Maoist a fertile ground to propagate their agenda and spread their influence in newer areas of the country.

 

Tackling Naxalism

The government has constituted an ‘Empowered Group of Ministers’ to counter the problem of Naxalism headed by the Home minister and select chief ministers. The government under the Unlawful Activities prevention Act (UAPA), 1967 amended in 2004 has banned the communist party of India (Marxist-Leninist)-People’s War and all its associated formations, and the Maoist communist centre (MCC)and its front organizations.

 

The government has also constituted a task force which will comprise of Nodal officers form the Naxal affected areas and officers from the IB, SSB and CRPF. There is also a coordination center that was set up in 1998 headed by the union home minister with chief  Secretaries and DGPs of the Naxal affected areas for the coordination of steps taken to control Naxal activities. The government has laid down a clear plan to tackle the left wing extremism. It has formulated a two pronged strategy to solve the problem of Naxalism.

 

Law and order Approach

With the UPA government coming back to power after the 2009, General Elections, some forward movement on the security front have gained traction under Home Minister, P. Chidambaram. Some of the measures that the Central Government has advanced on the security front include:

1.      Increasing the strength of various central paramilitary forces such as the central Reserve police Force (CRPF) and the commando Battalions for Resolute Action (cobra)

2.      Providing assistance and training to state police forces though Ministry of Defence and central police organizations.

3.      Modernization and up gradation of state police forces and their Intelligence machinery under the scheme for modernization of state (MPF)

4.      Streamlining intelligence collection and dissemination between security agencies.

5.      Setting aside additional budgets for building security related infrastructure in Naxal areas such as Police stations, bunkers, roads etc.

6.      Setting up of a unified command in each of the Naxal Affected States for better coordination and assistance.

 

Beside the above, the central government has taken keen interest in restructuring the command and control setups in the Maoist affected states. To neutralize the advantage Maoist derive in the border areas out of jurisdictional conflict, the central government has set up a unified command thus facilitating increased Co-ordination in offensive strategies mounted on the Maoists by different states.

 

Table 1: CIAT School Allocations (under 11th plan)

SL. No.

State

Allocation of CIAT schools under 11th plan period of LWE states

1

Bihar

3

2

Chhattisgarh

4

3

Jharkhand

4

4

Orissa

3

5

West Bengal

1

 

Total

15

Source: Annual Home Ministry Report 2010-2011

 

Under the security Related Expenditure (SRE), the Govt. of India has increased the operational budgets of the security forces as well as increased allocation with regard to the Rehabilitation policy, under which a certain amount of money is given to a Maosit cadre upon surrender. In addition to increased financial outlays on security, the central government is increasingly focusing on raising special cobra forces for each of the Naxal Affected states. 20 counter Insurgency and Anti-Terrorist (CIAT) schools have been planned under the 11th plan. A special commando and military training school under the aegis of the Indian Army has been set up in Chhattisgarh as well. A special scheme for infrastructure under the 11th plan was approved by the Government with an allocation of Rs.500 core upgrading crucial road network, fortified police bunkers, police camps, helipads etc.

 

Social Integration Approach

Social Economic Development

According to the Annual report 2010-2011 prepared by the union Home Ministry, as many as 35 districts in 9 states have been identified for a “Focus Area Approach” in terms of development. Under this the following measures have been taken:

a.       Under Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadakyojana (PMGSY), a provision of Rs 2000 crore   has been made in 2010-2011.

b.      Ministry of tribal affairs has released an amount of 499.99 crore as additional central Assistance for construction of hostels and Ashram school buildings.

c.       A road Requirement plan has been approved by the Government for construction of National Highways, state Highways and major district roads at a cost of Rs 7300 crore in the eleventh Five year plan.

d.      Under ‘Indira Awaasyojana’, an amount of Rs 1000 crore was released in 2008-2009 to Naxal affected districts in total. In addition to this, the planning commission has identified 60 districts, including 35 focus districts as mentioned above, for implementation of Integrated Action plan (IAP) for selected Tribal and Backward districts with an outlay of Rs 3300crore for two years i.e.-2010-2011 and 2011-2012.

 

 

 

While the above schemes are designed to address basic infrastructure and development concerns, basic livelihood issue is as important.

The Ministry of Agriculture has recognized this concern. In a response to a question in the RajyaSabha, the minister of state Agriculture presented a brief overview of the various centrally sponsored schemes to increase agriculture productivity and add vibrancy to the agriculture sector in the Maoist affected areas.

(see table below)

 

The below Schemes look good on paper. The question remains: How effective have they really been in improving livelihood prospects among tribals? We saw in chapter 3 how politician-corporate-bureaucrat nexus has deprived trible of their agricultural land. In absence of agricultural land holding, what good are the above schemes and Policies ?  Even if a few tribes do hold agricultural land, how effective have these scheme proved in uplifting them? Data from the planning Commission, Govt. of India presents a sordid picture. While new schemes are being designed every year with bloated budgetary allocations, a critical appraisal of existing welfare programmes is the need of the hour to identify the critical focus areas with regards to tribal development. The following progress report by the planning commission on the Integrated Action plan (IAP), especially conceived for Naxal affected areas brings out the administrative failure at the lowest levels in programme implementation.

 

In India, it seems the government takes a back seat after the sanctioning process, thinking the job is done. The lack of oversight and will to see its own ideas and policies implemented on the ground is abdication of duty and responsibility on the part of the Indian state. It is this step-motherly treatment towards the tribals that is responsible for the deep fault-lines that exist between the local tribal communities and the Indian state. A cursory look at the above data will tell you how poorly the schemes of the Central Government are performing. Some scheme are still in progress and whatever is shown completed on paper has not brought vital changes in the problems of tribals and rural population.

 

Table 2: Centrally Sponsored  Agricultural Schemes

Macro Management of Agriculture Schemes: This scheme has been formulated with the objective to ensuring that the central Assistance is spent on focused and specific interventions for  development of Agriculture in areas of priority of different states. It became operational in    2000-01 in all states and uts. The schemed provide sufficient flexibility to the states to develop and pursue the programmes on the basis of their regional priorities mainly connected with development of rice, wheat, sugarcane and coarse cereals through an appropriate mix of measures aimed at enhancement of soil health, supply of quality seeds and other inputs and promotion of agricultural mechanization. The scheme also lays special emphasis on natural Resource Management through watershed development management approach.

 

Technology Mission on cotton (TMC-Mini Mission -11): ThisMission has been in operation since 2000-01. Its main objectives are to improve production, productivity, quality of cotton; to reduce cultivation costs in the country; and to raise the income of the farmers. It is being implemented in 13 states viz; Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. The Mission envisages an end-to-end approach comprising varietal improvement; increased/production /productivity, marketing infrastructure; and processing facilities.

 

Integrated scheme of oilseeds, pulses, oil palm and Maize (ISOPOM): In order to provide flexibility to the states in implementation based on regionally differentiated approach, to promote  crop diversification and to provide focused approach tothe programmes, a centrally sponsored scheme of integrated scheme of Oilseeds, Pulses, Oilpalm, and Maize (ISOPOM) is being implemented since 1.4.2004 by merging the four erstwhile schemes of oilseeds production programme (OPP); National pulses Development project (NPDP); oilpalm Development(OPDP) and Accelerated maize Development programme(AMDP)

 

National Horticulture Mission: The Mission was launched in 2005-06 in order of give a new impetus/momentum to development of horticulture to generate employment and enhance farm incomes. The Mission aims at addressing problems related to generation of technology, production, post-harvest management and processing and marketing under one umbrella in the horticulture sector.

 

Micro Irrigation: In dry land/rain fed areas it is necessary to increase water use efficiency for optimum utilization of available water, reduce the cost of production and to stabilize the production. In order to ensure optimum utilization of water resources a scheme called micro irrigation was approved for implementation in march, 2006. Its main objective is to increase the area under efficient methods of irrigation viz drip and sprinkler irrigation as these methods have been recognized as only alternative for efficient use of surface as well as ground water resources.

 

Agricultural Extensions: For improving and strengthening agricultural extensions service in the private sector, efficient use and easier availability of the inputs and utilization of skilled and technical manpower in the agriculture sector, a scheme of Agri-clinics and Agri-Business centers has been taken up. Beside, a scheme of Mass Media Support to Agriculture extension is being implemented to provide information to farmers on matters related to Agriculture production. In order to help the farmers in tackling problems relating to pest attack, plant disease, use of inputs, a scheme of  ‘Kissan call Centers’is being implemented. A new centrally sponsored scheme entitled “Support to state Extension programmes  for extension Reforms” was launched in March,2005 with the objective to making extension system farmer driven and farmer accountable by way of promoting new institutional arrangements namely Agricultural technology Management Agency (ATMA) for technology dissemination particularly at District level land below.

 

National Food Security Mission: Government of India, Department of agriculture andCooperation has approved the launching of a centrally Sponsored Scheme “National Food Security Mission  (NFSM)” to enhance the production of rice, wheat and pulses during the eleventh five year plan. The NFSM has three components viz. NFSM-Rice, NFSM –wheat and NFSM-pulses. The plan outlay for National Food security Mission is Rs.4500 crore for the eleventh plan period. The following districts of Naxalite affected States are covered under NFSM-rice (Khammam, Gaya, Rajnandgaon, Surguja, Gumla, Hazaribagh, West Singhbhum, Gudchiroli, Deogarh, Malkangiri and Sonebhadra); NFSM-wheat (Jamui, Rohtas, Balaghat and Sonebhadra) andNFSM-pulses(Khammam,Aurangabad, Rajanadgaon and Surguja)

 

RashtriyaKrishiVikasYojana (RKVY) under State plan: Department has launched a new scheme “RashtriyaKrisiVikasyojana” (RKVY) for its implementation during the 11th Five year plan Outlay of Rs. 25000 crore. The Scheme envisages a quantifiable increase in Agriculture and allied sector production, productivity and farm income and reduction in yield gaps

Source: written answers to unstarred Questions, Rajyasabha parliament of India.

 


Gaps in Implementation: Development

The development programmes for the dalits and tribals have not made much of a dent on the social and economic conditions of a vast section of these two groups. This is borne out by the human development indicators-poverty, literacy, health access to social amenities referred to earlier which show wide gaps in the status of these groups when compared to the other communities. The institutional mechanisms of special component plan and Tribal sub plan have also failed to bridge this gap. A scrutiny of implementation of these two sub-plans shows that the state governments are reluctant to earmark the required allocation of funds for the communities and the place them at the disposal of the nodal department. The planning is uncoordinated and adhoc. Still worse, the allocated funds remain substantially under-utilized and eventually lapse. There is also disinterestedness to work out a time bound strategy to bridge the development gaps between them and the rest of the population and to design occupation specific schemes to improve their status. Even at the central level, a substantial number of ministries fail to make any provision under these sub-plans on the ground that their activities are not divisible. As for the extension of credit by the banks, the picture is even more pessimistic. The reluctance of banks to extend credit to the members of these communities is widespread. They are considered unbankable as they have no collateral security to other. Even in the programmes where a subsidy component is provided to the banks under the self-employment programmes to induce them to lend, the credit extension is too meager to be effective use and that tooafter a lot of efforts and pressures. The situation has worsened after the reforms initiated on the recommendations of the Narasimhan committee.

 


 

Table 3: IAP Financial summary Report ( Rs in lakhs) as on MAR 2011-2012

                 Physical progress                                                                                  Financial progress

Sl No

State Name

No.

of

projects sanctioned

No. of projects Taken up

No. of projects completed

No. of project taken up Progress

% prol. completed. takenup

Central funds Released upto 2011-12

Amount for which work taken up

Expenditure

% Expd. to central funds Released

1

Andhra Pradesh

3000

2804

1437

1367

51.25

54000.00

27019.79

14014.66

31.14

2

Bihar

12731

12475

10172

2303

81.54

60500.00

33507.35

18883.51

31.21

3

Chhattisgarh

13659

13628

10270

3358

75.36

75000.00

52247.69

37580.31

50.11

4

Jharkhand

12348

12218

9007

3211

73.72

12000.00

99207.82

63569.60

52.97

5

Madhya Pradesh

5421

5421

3896

1525

71.87

64000.00

41297.66

27222.05

42.53

6

Maha-rashtra

4387

4363

4059

304

93.03

15000.00

11253.08

9093.77

60.6

7

Orissa

17085

16686

11178

5508

66.99

127500.00

91637.40

67260.26

52.75

8

Uttar Pradesh

1604

1604

1406

198

87.66

17500.00

5806.48

4444.91

25.40

9

West Bengal

2301

2301

1493

808

64.88

17500.00

8751.22

5846.63

33.41

Consolidated summary

Grand total

72536

71500

52918

18582

74.01

542000.00

370728.49

247915.71

45.74

Source: Planning Commission Website (http://pcserver .nic.in/iapmis/reportindex.aspx)

 


 

Shrey Verma: Far Reaching Consequences of the Naxalite Problem in India. The financing and development corporations set up exclusively for these groups to provide capital self-employment suffer from poor management, low recovery of loan advanced, absence of dedicated field agencies to proposals and oversee projects and delay in release  of share capital by the central and the concerned state governments (planning commission, 2007). Overall, the failure of development efforts to improve the conditions of the dalits and tribals can be attributed to:

a.       Inadequate investment of public resources.

b.      Non-utilization, wrong utilization and diversion of earmarked, allocated or committed funds for their benefit,

c.       Deficiency in planning,

d.      Poor project preparation,

e.       Absence of monitoring,

f.       Unresponsive and even biased delivery system,

g.      Resistance from the non-dalit/ tribal communities,

h.      Absence of participation in programmes by beneficiaries, and

i.        Powerlessness of the communities to exert requisite pressure.

 

The panchayati Raj Institutions have made no difference to the situation. This overall picture, however, does not imply that a small section of these communities (referred to as the elite) with benefit of reservation, education and social capital have not improved their status. But the overwhelmingly large number of the dalits and tribals do not show signs of significant change in their status.

 

Policy Response to Naxalism

How does the approach of the government to deal with the Naxalite violence measure up to this understanding of the roots of Naxalite movement. Is it adequately sensitive to the factors contributing to its growth? To answer this question, it would be useful to refer to the programme outlined by the Maoists and compare it with the strategy outlined by the government to deal with them. The programme of Maoists concentrates on agrarian reforms involving redistribution of land to the landless, equal rights to the women in ownership of land, agricultural development with guaranteed remunerative price for the produce, fixed wages and hours of work for male and female workers, abolition of contract and child labour, guaranteed employment and social insurance and elimination of regional inequalities. In respect of the tribals, the programme involves liberating them from the trader-contractor-money lender nexus and upholding their demands for self –identity, dignity and autonomy. These programmes are expected to liberate the poor and socially marginalized groups from the structure of violence they experience in their daily lives and thereby democratize Indian society (Gupta, 2006). This goal is sought to be achieved by first carving out a ‘new democratic revolution’ through armed struggle for seizure of power as its principal task. The party would then continue to engage in protracted people’s war directed against the forces of imperialism, feudalism capitalism and supporting struggles against social oppression, untouchability and castism, self determination of nationalities and equality of women.

 

Shorn of the radical rhetoric, the programmes outlined by the Maoists seem to be not very different from those already introduced/ supported by the government. But this apparent similarity gets exposed when we look at the poor record of implementation whether of land reforms or abolition of untouchability or enforcement of labour laws etc. as discussed earlier in this paper. In fact, over the years, and particularly after the onset of neo-liberal economy, these issues disappeared from the public policy discourse. In many cases, equity oriented policies have been replaced by market oriented policies. The larger society is apathetic to these issues which have also ceased to interest major political parties as they all support the current paradigm of economic growth.

 

As for the specific policy response to deal with naxalism, some critical policy statements are relevant. The prime Minister, in his address to the meeting of the standing committee of the six naxalite states on April 13, 2006, recognized that factors such as exploitation, artificially depressed wages, iniquitous socio-political circumstances, inadequate employment opportunities, lack of access to resources, under-developed agriculture, geographical isolation and lack of land reforms contributed to the movement (Gupta, 2006). The latest  report of the MHA (Ministry of Home Affairs) has lamented that the naxalites try to benefit from the overall underdevelopment and from sub-normal functioning of field institutions like police stations, tehsils, development blocks, schools, primary health centers and anganwadi centers, which administer and provide services at the ground level, and identifies issues of good governance, development, regular functioning of critical field institutions and public awareness essential for dealing with naxalite activities, in addition to core policing requirements. The government has characterized its approach as ‘holistic’ since it covers the areas of security, development, administration and public perception (MHA,2009). In his address at the DGP’s and IG’s conference recently, the Prime Minister emphasized that ‘left wing extremism required a nuanced strategy it cannot be treated simply as a law and order problem. Despite its sanguinary nature, the movement manages to retains the support of a sections of the civil society, the intelligentsia and the poorest of the poor in many affected areas. It still retains certain elan. All this adds to the complexity of the problem. I expect you to keep this in mind as you devise newer and better strategies to deal with this problem ‘(PMO,2009). These statements may be compared with the programme outlined by the government to tackle the naxalite problem to see whether there is harmony between the two.

 

This programme is focused on pursuing effective and sustained police action against naxalites, prohibiting peace dialogue by the states with naxalites unless they give up crime, violence and arms, formulating of effective surrender and rehabilitation polices for naxalites who shun crime, violence and arms, extensive use of media to highlight the utility of the naxal ideology and violence and providing assistance to the states in effective policing. The strengthening of police organization and security apparatus which forms the core of this programme includes assistance for providing secure police station buildings, trained personnel, basic amenities for personal, specialized equipment, weaponry and vehicles, strengthening state intelligence set ups, optimization of existing training capacity and creating additional capacity, raising specialized units trained in counter-insurgency and jungle warfare, expeditious filling up of vacancies in state police forces, improvement in police population ratio and expeditious investigation and prosecution of naxalite crimes. The financial assistance of the central government is also being provided to the state government for s deployment of central paramilitary forces, setting up of COBRA battalion, counter-insurgency, anti-terrorist schools, sanctioning IR battalion, modernization of state police force, hiring helicopters, appointment of special police officers, surrender and rehabilitation programme, filling up critical infrastructure gaps in affected areas and technical support. Elaborate central institutional mechanism for review and coordination has been established at two levels Home Ministry and cabinet secretariat for a coordinated strategy. The development measures are, no doubt, included in this ‘holistic’ approach which stress on qualitative implementation of central and state development schemes with fair deal to the deprived sections, fair and firm land administration with attention on maintenance of land records, expeditious recording of mutations and fair disposal of land disputes without undue delay, appropriate mechanisms for grievance redressal, public contact and awareness. The new development initiative consists of Backward Regions Grant Fund in 250 Districts and effective implementation of the scheduled tribes and other Traditional forest Dwellers (Recognition of forest Rights Act,  2006 ).

 

Apart from the stated strategy of the central government, the states have, at the operational level, extended special laws which empower the police to detain people on suspicion of involvement and abetment of activities and deny bail to the accused persons. They have also imposed restrictions formal and informal on the movement of outsiders particularly human rights activists, media, intellectuals, NGOs in the area and contact with the people. Encouragement is given along with arms to groups within the affected areas to resist the Naxalites so as to reduce the pressure on the security forces. In Chhattisgarh, the strategy has also involved depopulating the villages and herding together their residents in makeshift camps ostensibly to provide ‘protection’ from possible naxalite attack known as ‘SalwaJudum’. There is also strict secrecy about flow of information from the area beyond  what is officially provided.

 

The above approach to deal with naxalism is far from holistic. Rather, it is ‘security-centric’. It is overwhelmingly fixated on curbing violence and maintenance of law and order. The complex naxal phenomenon has been seen entirely through the prism of violence of the naxaalites. The development and governance dimensions are incorporated as a footnote to this approach and lack understanding of the context of violence which is at the heart of naxalism and the vision to combat its influence. The programmes outlined for development and governance fail even to refer to let alone address the whole gamut of structural violence that the people from the socially marginalized sections, which from bulk of the population in the affected areas, face from the landed castes and lately the corporate class and in the tribals also from the non-tribals backed by the police, bureaucracy and judicial system. In other words, the dimension of social justice is missing from its perspective. In development matters, it basically involves creation of the infrastructure- physical and social and the implementation of the existing development schemes. As we have seen, without eliminating structural violence, multifaceted exploitation and deprivation and reforming insensitive governance which are at the root of naxalism, access to development programmes and opportunities for advancement and participation would remain blocked. Without breaking the feudal land owning and caste dominated power structure and its nexus with the governance institutions, changing some of its polices including transfer of productive resources to the corporate which impoverish the people, sensitizing governance and activating political institutions and processes to aggressively articulate their problems and strive for their redressal the suggested measures in the strategy would fail to remove alienation of the people from the government and democratic apparatus and convince them that they can get justice and equality within the existing political order. The report of expert Group on Development Challenges in Extremist Affected Areas (2008) constituted by the planning commission (planning commission,2008) has also recommended, by and large, measures on these lines. The sincerity and determination of the government to pursue this course of action is the key to gaining trust and faith of the people in the system. In this effort, the government would have to involve individuals and groups from the civil society who have long experience of working in the area and whom the people repose confidence. These persons can help the state in designing measures which would restore people’s trust in its sincerity and ability to address their concerns and helping in to implement them and monitoring their impact. Given this perspective, rubbishing and maligning human rights activists, intellectuals and those who empathize with the affected people as supporters of the naxalite violence is not only unhelpful but counterproductive.

 

The Laws Made by the Government

Rehabilitation and Resettlement police, 2007

The main aim ofthis act is to minimize the displacement of people and to promote non-displacing or least displacing alternatives. The Government issued a Rehabilitation policy on 11 october 2007 for the easy displacement of people who lose their land for industrial growth. Under this policy land in change for land will be given, job prospective to at least one member of the family, vocational training and housing benefits including houses to people in rural areas and urban areas will be some of the benefits.

 

Forest Rights Act, 2006

The Scheduled tribe and other Traditional Forest dwellers( Recognition of Forest Rights) Act 2006 or the Forest Rights Act recognizes the rights of the scheduled tribes and forest dwellers who have been living in the forests for years but their rights have still not been recognized. The ministry of Environment and Forest has also allowed use of 1 hectare of land for non-51 forest purposes and conversion of kutcha roads into pukka roads.

 

Chhattisgarh Special public securities Act, 2006

This bill provides definition of unlawful activities, declaring an organization unlawful, formation of an advisory board wherever the state government feels the need for its establishment, procedure of the formation of the advisory board, action of the advisory board, penalties viz punishments even for not committing a crime, the power to notify a place being used for unlawful activities and taking occupation of such place there of and revision/bar against intervention by the courts.

 

Are these laws effective?

These laws have in many ways caused a lot of problems to the tribals and the scheduled casts by negating the spirit of the various safeguards available to the scheduled tribes under the constitution and other laws in the country. The act providing ‘land for land’ has become a nightmare for the government and has become a stumbling block for ensuring industrialization. As per the unlawful activities prevention act (UAPA) the government has banned all organizations that have any connections with any Naxal movements like the MCC or the CPI-M(Marxist-Leninist). There was no need of this bill to tackle Naxalism. This bill was formulated, only to silence the appropriate discord and dissent brewing in the minds of people in the areas affected by Naxalim due to persistent ignorance by the government to their situation. This bill has also failed to make a distinction between the anti-social, anti-national elements from the people who are peace loving.

 

CSPS bill, 2005 also provide the District Magistrate unconditional powers to notify places which the thinksarebeingused for unlawful activities without any prior notification. There is no requirement of production of anything as evidence to prove that the said place is being used for unlawful activities. It is just a violation of principles of natural justice as the aggrieved parties don’t even get a fair hearing. This bill also provides that any revision application has to be filed with the High court only, challenging the validity of the order of the government. This petition has to be filed within 30 days and that no court has the injunction against any decision of the court. Any kind of application or form of revision or injunction by a court or officer except for the High court and the Supreme court regarding any action to be taken as a follow up to the order  of the government has been barred in this bill. So it can be said that this bill was totally uncalled for and has only be brought to act as a blandishment to the people.

 

Which Approach is better ?

The approach which I find as the solution which will solve the problem of Naxalism is the social Integration. The tribals and scheduled castes that live in the Naxal affected areas have been neglected for the past many decades and now want some attention from the government. Providing them with incentives like giving them right over the forest produce from the forests in which they have been living for generation, providing them with house etc. is the right modus of solving their basic problems. The main reason for the spread of Naxalism is the exploitation of poor and scheduled castes. The main thing which has to be done is to enforce land ceiling laws, utilization of the funds provided to government to the maximum and political expediency. Use of police forces should be to enforce the land ceiling laws, evict landlords and ensure land to the farmers for cultivation. They should be provided with police protection, and proper rehabilitation for the people who have been displaced should be ensured. Security as well as development has to run hand in hand to counter the Naxal problem.

 

The government has to instill faith in the people that they will be governed in better manner than by the Naxals. The government should include laws in the forest act that only forest dwelling tribes and scheduled castes should be allowed to use the produce of the forest. Proper guarding of financial institutions sanctioning loans to these tribes should be ensured which will help these tribes to realize that the government is with them. 

 

CONCLUSION:

The state has to do much more than plan counter-insurgency operations or support violent vigilant groups to suppress the Naxalite movement. After close examination of the historical and ideological origins of the movement, it is clear that the movement thrives on the dissatisfaction of the marginalized and alienates the population. The socio-economic perspective of Naxalism talks about how the rebel movement is shaped due to the failure of the institutional mechanisms and frameworks to deliver socio-economic justice. This article outlines the steps taken by the government, but concedes that it is not enough to over-emphasize the ‘law and order’ approach.

 

REFERENCES:

1.       http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/maoist/terrorist_outfits/Janashakti.htm

2.       http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/maoist/terrorist_outfits/PWG.htm

3.       Banerjee Sumanta.(1980)In the wake of Naxlbari: A History of the Naxalite Movement in India,. Published by Subarnarekha,

4.       Choudhary, C.andDandekar,A.(2010), ‘PESA, Left-Wing Extremism and Governance:Concerns and  challenges in India’s tribal Districts’,IRMA Ahmedabad, Ministry of PanchayatiRaj,Govt. of India

5.       Debnath,Sailen. (1947)ed. Social and political Tensions in North Bengal Since 1947,ISBN 81-86860-23-1.

6.       Kujur,R.(2008). Naxal Movement in India: A profile,NewDelhi:IPCS Research paper.

7.       Dixit Raman. (2010). Naxalite Movement in India: The State’s Response, Journal of Defence Studies, Vol4. No2. April 2010.

8.       Ghosh Shankar,(1975) The Naxalite Movement: A Maoist Experiment, Published byFirma K.L. Mukhopadhyay, 1975.ISBN0-88386-568-8.

9.       Answers to Unstarred Question, website of Raja Sabha, Parliament of India.

10.     Report in Integrated Action Plan, website of planning Commission of India.

11.     Plan panel readies scheme for Maoist-hit districts, The Economic Times, Feb08,2011

12.     “Development Plan for Naxal-hit districts shows good response” the times of India. 2011-06-23

13.      “Walking with The Comrades” An extensive 32 page essay by Arundhati Roy on her interactions with naxalites.

 

Received on 29.05.2014

Modified on 25.06.2014

Accepted on 28.07.2014

© A&V Publication all right reserved

Research J. Humanities and Social Sciences. 5(2): April-June, 2014, 180-190